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Introduction
(1) Basic Concepts
A typical payment by wire transfer is initiated by a paying party
("sending customer")' instructing his bank2 ("originating bank")
to carry out payment to the account of another party ("benefici-
ary") with a bank ("destination bank"). In an international trans-
action, where both banks are distant from each other, the
interbank message is usually transmitted by cable, telex or wire.
This is where the name "wire transfer" comes from.
Payment by wire transfer is executed by the originating bank
debiting the account of the sending customer and by the desti-
nation bank crediting the account of the beneficiary. Interbank
settlement takes place either through a correspondent account
maintained by one bank for another, a network settlement
account maintained for all participating banks, or, in domestic
transfers, on the books of the central bank. Where the two banks
are not linked by any of those settlement facilities, the originating
bank must employ a correspondent bank to transmit the payment
message. Such a correspondent will transmit either directly to the
destination bank or, depending on the availability of mutual
settlement facilities, via another intermediary. In principle, each
bank sending an interbank payment message ("transmitting
bank") must have a settlement facility with the bank receiving the
message ("receiver"), in the form of a correspondent account, a
network settlement account, or on the books of the central bank.
Accordingly, the number of banks involved in each wire payment
depends on the availability of pertinent relationships to be utilized
between the originating and destination banks.3
Conceptually, the wire transfer payment is a species of giro
system. "GIRO" is derived from the Greek word for circle. It
denotes the cyclic operation involved in the transfer of credit
balances from one bank account into another.4 Giro payments are
I In the absence of governing statutory rules, terminology used is far from uniform or
consistent. The terminology adopted in this article attempts to conform to that of UCC
Draft Article 4A (cited in footnote 42, infra).
2 Throughout this article, "bank" is broadly used to denote any depository financial
institution.
3 For a description of the operation of the domestic "telex" transfer of funds in Canada,
where no intermediaries separate the originating and destination banks, see S. Goldstein
Changing Times; Banking in the Electronic Age (1979, Report prepared for the
Government of Canada), pp. 114-15.
4 See, e.g., E.P. Ellinger, "The Giro System and Electronic Transfers of Funds", [1986]
L.M.C.L.Q. 178.
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either credit or debit transfers. In the former, the paying party's
instructions are communicated by him directly to his bank so as to
"push" funds from his account to that of the payee. In the latter,
the paying party's instructions are communicated to his bank by
the payee via his own bank so as to "pull" or "draw" funds from
the paying party's account into that of the payee .5 Wire payment is
thus a method of credit transfer of funds.
Payment systems, whether credit or debit transfers, are either
paper-based or electronic funds transfers, depending on the
medium embodying the payment instructions. 6 Electronic
payment is a generic term for any fund transfer or payment
mechanism that relies primarily on computerized communication
systems rather than paper instruments. 7
In the broad sense, the wire payment, as a species of credit
transfer, can operate either as a paper-based or as an electronic
system. Nevertheless, it is the electronic dimension which has
recently given the wire transfer its present prominence. The most
important attribute of a wire payment service is the underlying
communication system facilitating speed, single transaction focus,
and great security. This makes the wire payment rather expensive
and suitable primarily for large corporate payments. 9
(2) The Current Law
There is an overall consensus that the rules governing credit
transfers are poorly developed or, at least, that in many respects
they are unsettled. 10 There is no consensus either as to the
particular legal doctrine from which the relevant rules should be
derived. Legal relationships and finality of payment have
generated the most extensive judicial as well as academic analysis.
According to Penney and Baker, most American courts charac-
terized the sending customer-originating bank relationship as one
of agency.11 American courts have held the originating bank liable
5 See, in general, B. Geva, "The Concept of Payment Mechanism" (1986), 24 O.H.L.J. 1,
at pp. 6-7.
6 Ibid.
7 For this definition, see B.K. Stone, "Electronic Payment Basics" (1986),71 Ec. Rev. Fed.
Res. Bank of Atlanta 3:9.
8 Indeed, the interbank payment instructions can be communicated by ordinary mail.
9 See Stone, supra, footnote 7, at p. 10. The alleged "low cost" feature of the wire payment
(see, e.g., text, infra, around footnote 183) is in relation to the amount of the average wire
payment and not as compared to other payment systems.
t0 For this point see works cited below as well as H.S. Scott, "Corporate Wire Transfers and
the Uniform New Payments Code" (1983), 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1664.
I N. Penney and D.I. Baker, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfer Systems (Boston, New
[Vol. 14
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to the sending customer for losses resulting from delay, failure of
its correspondent to follow instructions, failure to effect credit at
all, and impossibility of performance. 12 No consensus has emerged
as to the beneficiary's position in the funds transfer, whether as a
third party beneficiary or as assignee.13 American courts have not
hesitated to fasten liability on an intermediary bank acting as the
originating bank's correspondent for the failure to carry out the
wire payment, though only for reasonably foreseeable loss.14
Finally, judicial efforts in the United States to determine time of
payment have not produced any consensus as to the particular
time when "finality" is reached. 15
In discussing the nature of relationships created by credit
transfers, Bradley Crawford concludes that a simple banking
relationship provides the link between the sending customer and
the originating bank as well as between the beneficiary and the
destination bank.16 Crawford is quite skeptical as to the wholesale
applicability of agency concepts to any of these two
relationships. 17 In general, his view is that particularly in deter-
mining finality of payment, 18 the evolving law of credit transfers
should give great deference to banking practice. In his view,
private agreements, between a customer and his banker as well as
among banks, are also an important source of rules governing
credit transfers.
Professor Ellinger provides a detailed analysis from an English
perspective. 19 Dealing with the legal nature of money transfer
orders, he observes that unlike the case of cheques and their
clearance, "no certainty ... prevails in respect of money transfer
orders. ' 20 In his view, "[o]nly three points can be asserted with
confidence. "21
York, Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1980), pp. 24-8 to 10 (with 1986 Cum. Sup. by D.J.
Baker and R.E. Brandel, assisted by D.E. Feld).
12 Authorities are cited by Penney and Baker, ibid., at p. 24-10 and footnotes 22 to 25.
13 Ibid., at pp. 24-14 to 16.
14 Penney and Baker, Cum. Sup., supra, footnote 11, at pp. S24-2 to 6. The leading case is
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill., 1981), revd 673 F. 2d 951
(7th Cir., 1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 377 (1983). However, in that case (discussed in
text, infra, around footnotes 180 to 182) loss was not found to be reasonably foreseeable.
15 Penney and Baker, supra, footnote 11, at pp. 24-26 to 21.
16 B. Crawford, Crawford and Falconbridge Banking and Bills of Exchange, 8th ed.
(Toronto, Canada Law Book Inc., 1986), Vol. 1, pp. 1017-28.
17 On this point he is in agreement with R. King, "The Receiving Bank's Role in Credit
Transfer Transactions" (1982), 45 Mod. L. Rev. 369.
18 Crawford, supra, footnote 16, at pp. 1028-35.
19 Supra, footnote 4, at pp. 195-205.
20 Ibid., at p. 195.
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The first is that the documents used in money transfer payments
are not negotiable instruments. 22 They do not comply with the
statutory requirements of Bills of Exchange Acts or of Article 3 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Thus, the giro form is typically
payable neither at a determinable future time nor on demand, is
payable neither to the order of a specified person nor to the
bearer, and does not include formal instructions by the sending
customer to the originating bank. 23 Also, the initiation of a money
transfer payment does not require a written document. Hence, the
law of negotiable instruments is inapplicable to the wire transfer
payments.
The second point, according to Ellinger, is that the law of
assignment of debts is, "in all probability" ,24 inapplicable. Stated
otherwise, the money transfer order does not by itself operate as
an assignment of funds in the originating bank's hands in favour of
the beneficiary or his bank. 25
The third point, which is the "only positive rule", 26 is that for
most purposes the relationships of the parties to money transfer
orders are governed by the law of agency. "[M]oney transfer
orders involve a string of operations carried out by the different
banks acting in a representative capacity." 27
As the sending customer's agent, 28 the originating bank is
obliged to carry out the instruction given to it with reasonable skill
and care, though not with "strict compliance" as under
documentary letter of credit law. 29 This duty can be broken down
to three specific obligations: (a) the amount must be transferred
on time; (b) the originating bank must engage a reliable corr-
21 Ibid.
22 On this point, Professor Ellinger must have been referring to documents embodying the
sending customer's instructions.
23 Supra, footnote 4 at pp. 196-7. Ellinger contends that the third ground is the "most
important ground for denying that a bank giro credit is a negotiable instrument". Id., at
p. 197. In my view this is an exaggeration. Also the standard cheque form does not
include explicit formal instructions.
24 Ibid., atp. 195.
25 Ibid., at pp. 197-9. On this point see also the detailed analysis of R.R. Pennington, A.H.
Hudson and J.E. Mann, Commercial Banking Law (1978), pp. 283-91.
26 Ellinger, supra, footnote 4, at p. 195.
27 Ibid., at p. 199.
28 See, ibid., at pp. 199-202.
29 On that point the leading authority is Royal Products Ltd. v. Midland Bank Ltd., [1981] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 194 (O.B.).
[Vol. 14
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espondent in the transmission of the money transfer order, and,
except for where a contractual disclaimer applies, it is vicariously
liable for the negligence or default of its correspondent; 30 and (c)
the duty of care is owed only to a sending customer who is the
originating bank's customer and not a stranger employing it.31
The correspondent transmitting bank is engaged by the origi-
nating bank. In English law, as there is no privity of contract
between a principal and a sub-agent, the transmitting corre-
spondent is not liable to the sending customer. 3 The opposite rule
applies in the United States. In Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp. ,33
a transmitting correspondent that had failed to carry out the
transfer was held liable to the sending customer for breach of
contract and negligence. 34
The agency position of the destination bank is less clear. 35 While
generally employed by the beneficiary, the destination bank may
also fulfill functions on behalf of either the sending customer or
the originating bank.36 Drawing lines is not always an easy task. 37
Professor Ellinger concludes by addressing questions relating to
time of payment and countermand. 38 He concedes that "[t]he
analysis of the legal relationships of the parties to money transfers
does not furnish a decisive answer to the question of when the
order is executed. ,39 Accordingly, he proposes to divide cases into
two groups: those dealing with countermand of payment, and
those determining the exact time of payment between the sending
customer and the beneficiary. His analysis of existing case law
leads him to the conclusion that a money transfer cannot be
countermanded when funds become available to the destination
30 On that point, in connection with the banker-customer relationship in general, the
leading authority is Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners Ltd. (1926), 27
LI. L. Rep. 49 (H.L.).
31 This is relevant where the originating bank accepts a transfer order from a stranger due to
an arrangement between the originating bank and the destination bank. In effect such an
arrangement is for the benefit of the beneficiary.
32 Ellinger, supra, footnote 4, at p. 202.
33 Supra, footnote 14.
34 Other aspects of this decision are discussed, infra, in Part 3(2), text around footnotes 179
to 183.
35 Cf. King,supra, footnote 17.
36 Cf. Ellinger, supra, footnote 4, at p. 204, raising the question of the destination bank's
liability to the sending customer for failure to carry out the payment.
37 Ellinger, ibid., at pp. 203-05.
38 Ibid., at pp. 205-16.
39 Ibid., at p. 205.
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bank on behalf of the beneficiary. However, payment to the
beneficiary is completed only when the funds become available to
the beneficiary himself.
Overall, the preceding analysis indicates the inadequacy of
existing rules in providing certainty and a comprehensive body of
law governing wire transfer payments. Several points deserve
particular attention.
To begin with, there is no consensus as to the applicability of
agency law. Even if relationships created by credit transfers are
governed by agency law, its exact application is far from certain.
For example, each participating bank may perform some
functions for the sending customer, some for the beneficiary, some
for another bank, and others on its own behalf. However, classifi-
cation in any instance may be impossible.
Secondly, English law governing the liability in negligence of a
correspondent transmitting bank may prove to be unsatisfactory.
If there is no privity between the sending customer and the corre-
spondent and assuming the originating bank's vicarious liability
may be effectively disclaimed, what recourse does the sending
customer have against the correspondent's deficient performance?
A related question is the measure of damages. No comprehensive
body of law has developed providing for the scope of liability for
defective performance of banks' duties.
Thirdly, cases dealing with finality of payment are not easy to
reconcile. 40 It is submitted that Ellinger's suggestion of distin-
guishing between cases dealing with the revocability of the
transfer order and cases concerned with the completion of "cash"
payment between the sending customer and the beneficiary4 is a
step in the right direction. None the less, even this approach is
clouded with much uncertainty. For example, the availability of
funds to the destination bank requires determination of the
binding effect of the interbank payment instructions. Availability
of funds to the beneficiary requires the determination of several
other questions, such as the duty of the destination bank to accept
a credit transfer for its customer, the time when the destination
bank is required to credit the customer's account with the amount
40 The leading case is Momm v. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd., [1977] Q.B. 790. Another attempt
to summarize and reconcile cases, in addition to those attempts referred to above, is by
A. Tyree, "Electronic Funds Transfer in New Zealand" (1978), 8 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 139, at
pp. 145-50.
41 See text, supra, around footnotes 38 and 39.
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of the credit transfer, and whether such credit is reversible upon
the destination bank's failure to obtain settlement for the credit
transfer.
Finally, the case law has not yet discussed extensively a
substantial number of questions. These include the allocation of
losses for unauthorized or altered credit transfers, mistakes in the
course of transmitting transfer orders, and erroneous instructions.
It is not suggested that common law doctrine is not sufficiently
robust and flexible to provide adequate answers. However, the
process is likely to be slow, uncertain, and unpredictable. On the
other hand, the increasing volume and importance of wire
transfers requires certainty as to parties' duties and the allocation
of losses as well as consistency in terminology.
Comprehensive legislation is a better way of resolving these
difficulties. Draft Article 4A of the American Uniform
Commercial Code 42 is one such model. It is designed to serve as "a
framework for future development of commercial practice and
law, as well as a codification of existing practice and law" 43 and will
be the focus of the present article. 4
(3) Scope of this Article
This article examines the provisions of Draft Article 4A in light
of existing common law rules as well as relevant policies. Article
4A is still at the drafting stage 45 and it is therefore premature to
42 Drafted under the auspices of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. The current text is a Draft for Discussion Only, dated September 28, 1987. A
previous draft was presented in December, 1986, and circulated on March 13, 1987 by the
Reporters Robert L. Jordan and William D. Warren to the Drafting Committee on
Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code - Current Payments Methods (hereafter
"a Previous Draft"). An earlier text was commented on by T.A. Beckett and K.S.
Dighe, "Wholesale Wire Transfers Under Draft Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial
Code" (1987), 1 B.F.L.R. 373. All references in this article, unless indicated otherwise,
are to the current text (of September 28, 1987).
43 Beckett and Dighe, ibid., at p. 373.
44 The Article 4A project emerged with the abandonment of plans to implement the
Uniform New Payments Code. The latter had a more ambitious design as it purported to
cover all payment systems and to replace UCC Article 4 as well as some federal legis-
lation, and furthermore, to supersede UCC Article 3 with respect to payment instru-
ments, including cheques. See Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC, Uniform New
Payments Code, P.E.B. Draft No. 3 (marked-up version showing changes from
Discussion Draft No. 8, June 2, 1983), and for a discussion, H.S. Scott, New Payment
Systems: A Report to the 3-4-8 Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code (1978).
45 The next Draft is expected to be published around February, 1988.
7-14 C.B.L.J.
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write a detailed commentary on its provisions. This article is
therefore primarily concerned with the basic concepts of Article
4A, concepts which have pretty much been finalized. The ultimate
objective of the article is to set the stage for a comprehensive
discussion on whether the rules provided by Article 4A serve as
firm foundations for the evolution of wire transfer payment law.
Part 1: General Provisions and Definitions
The first section, 4A-101, provides for a "short title" to Article
4A, that is, "Uniform Commercial Code -Wire Transfers".
Under s. 4A-102, Article 4A applies to "transactions for
payment pursuant to transfer orders". Several exceptions are
enumerated in s. 4A-104. They consist of transactions in which the
payment instructions are either embodied in commercial paper,
including cheques or drafts, governed by Article 3, or initiated by
means of credit or debit cards,46 as well as transactions where a
bank is instructed by a creditor to draw or collect from the debtor,
that is debit transfers, and consumer electronic payments
governed by the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act
("EFTA"). 47
All business credit transfers, 48 whether paper-based or
electronic, 49 thus fall within the scope of Article 4A.50 In fact, this
is broader than the standard "wire transfer" payment suggested by
the title of Article 4A.51
46 Comment 1 rationalizes this exclusion as premised on the similarity between payment by
card and payment by cheque. The Comment's position in the Previous Draft, under
which credit cards "are covered by Federal statutes" (see also second paragraph of the
Prefatory Note to the current Draft Article 4A) should be taken with a grain of salt.
Existing incomplete statutory coverage of credit cards does not parallel the compre-
hensive coverage given to instruments under Articles 3 and 4.
47 15 U.S.C. s. 1693 (Title XX, Public Law 95-630, 92 stat. 3728). The statute is imple-
mented by Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Part 205 (1981). In fact, neither the EFTA nor Reg.
E deals with the funds transfer as opposed to the consumer protection aspects of
consumer electronic payments. The rationale for the latter exclusion is thus not entirely
clear.
48 A "credit transfer" is initiated by payment instructions communicated directly by the
paying party to his bank, so as to "push" funds to the recipient's bank account. See, in
general, in the context of a discussion on the general framework of the transmission of
money, Geva, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 3-10, particularly at p. 6 .
49 See Comment 3 to s. 4A-103.
50 The point is reinforced by the definition of "transfer order" under s. 4A-103(1)(j),
discussed, infra, in the text which follows footnote 52.
51 See Introduction (1), supra. The widespread use of the "wire" mode of communication
explains the title of Article 4A: See Prefatory Note at p. 2. The large amount and the
[Vol. 14
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The Comment to s. 4A-102 identifies "transfer order" as the
crucial definitional term determining the scope of Article 4A. 52
Under s. 4A-103(1)(j), "[tjransfer order" is
an instruction transmitted to a bank15 3] to pay, or to cause another bank to
pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary if, pursuant to
the terms of the order, the destination bank is unconditionally permitted to
pay the beneficiary (i) on receipt by that bank of an instruction to pay or (ii)
on a day stated in the instruction.[54]
The definition goes on to state that a transfer order "may be trans-
mitted by any means, including an oral, written or electronic
communication". It further provides that where the instruction is
to make more than one payment, "the instruction is a separate
transfer order with respect to each of the payments."
According to Comment 2 to s. 4A-103, since "transfer order" is
defined as "an instruction transmitted to a bank to pay, or to cause
another bank to pay", Article 4A is limited to a payment made
through the banking system. This reads into the definition the
drafters' intent that the instruction must be communicated by the
paying party directly to his bank, and not via the payee. 5 Also, to
the extent that payment must be made "unconditionally", Article
4A does not cover payments to be made against the presentment
of complying documents, as required in a standard documentary
letter of credit transaction.5 6 As the Comment explains, wire
transfers are characterized by "low price and high speed"; banks'
functions thereunder are thus "essentially mechanical in
nature".
5 7
business nature of the typical payment account for another name given to this mode of
payment: "wholesale wire transfer". See Prefatory Note at p. 1.
52 The pertinent part of s. 4A-102 is quoted, supra, at the beginning of the paragraph
containing footnote 46. The centrality of the term is also highlighted on p. 3 of the
Prefatory Note.
53 "Bank" is broadly defined in UCC 1-201(4) as "any person engaged in the business of
banking". UCC 4-105, to which s. 4A-103(4) misleadingly refers, defines bank roles in
the collection system, such as "collecting bank", "payor bank", or "presenting bank".
54 Needless to say, the definition is to be read in light of the scope of the Article, as
discussed above. See also discussion, infra, around footnotes 55 to 57.
55 This distinction between direct communication and communication via the payee
underlies the difference between credit and debit transfer. See citation, supra, in
footnote 48. Also, the cheque is a payment instruction to a bank though as a debit
transfer, it is communicated to the payor bank via the payee.
56 It also does not cover payments to be made against a demand. The analogy made in
Comment 2 to s. 4A-103 between the banks' role in wire transfers and cheque collections
is thus not well thought out.
57 Comment 2 to s. 4A-103.
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The terms "beneficiary" and "destination bank", which appear
in the definition of "transfer order", are specifically defined in s. 4-
103(1). Paragraph (a) defines "beneficiary" as "the person to
whom, or to whose account, payment is to be made pursuant to a
transfer order." The "beneficiary" is thus the ultimate payee
under the transfer order. Paragraph (c) defines "destination
bank" as "the bank that is to make payment to the beneficiary
pursuant to a transfer order". Putting it another way, the "desti-
nation bank" is the beneficiary's bank.
As stated in s. 4A-102, 58 what falls within the ambit of Article
4A is "transactions for payment pursuant to transfer orders".
Hence, each "transfer order" is to trigger a "transaction for
payment". Presumably, "transaction for payment" is the equiv-
alent of "payment transaction", 59 defined in s. 4A-103(1)(f) as
"the series of transactions, commencing with the sending
customer's transfer order, that are made to effect payment to the
beneficiary of that order".
In practice, an interbank payment message may be in the form
of a bill of exchange. 6° Payment by wire transfer may thus include
a link which falls outside the scope of Article 4A. Unfortunately,
the statute is silent as to the interaction between its provisions and
outside sources of law under such circumstances. There may also
be doubts as to whether Article 4A applies at all to a "payment
transaction" where "the series of transactions" "pursuant to
transfer orders" is interrupted by payment instructions falling
outside the deliniation of "transfer order".
The "sending customer" referred to in s. 4A-103(1)(f), must be
taken to mean the party who initiates payment to the beneficiary,
that is, the payor, or the paying customer, normally the benefici-
ary's debtor. Nevertheless, to confirm this conclusion one has to
work carefully through several definitions. Thus, "sending
customer" is defined in para. (i) of s. 4A-103(1), as "a sender that
is not also a transmitting bank in the payment transaction".
"Sender" under para. (h), is "the issuer of a transfer order".
Under para. (e), a transfer order is issued "when it is received by
the receiver".
58 See, supra, at the beginning of the paragraph containing footnote 46.
59 This definitional inconsistency is of course unfortunate.
60 Apparently such was the "payment order" used in Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd. v. Attica
Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia ("The Laconia"), [1977] A.C. 850 (H.L.).
[Vol. 14
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However, this identifies the time of "issue" and not the identity
of the "issuer". The "issuer" under para. (h) is not the "receiver",
but rather the "sender" which, 61 by causing the "receiver" to
receive the transfer order, causes the transfer order to be "issued"
by the sender. This conclusion is supported by para. (g) defining
''receiver" as "the bank to which a transfer order is issued and is
either a transmitting bank or the destination bank". "Trans-
mitting bank", referred to in the definition of "sending customer"
as well as "receiver", 62 is defined in para. (k) of s. 4A-103(1) as
"the receiver of a transfer order if the execution of the order
requires the receiver to issue a transfer order to another bank".
Under s. 4A-103(1)(d), a sender's transfer order is "executed"
when "the receiver, if it is a transmitting bank, issues a transfer
order intended to carry out the sender's transfer order." Hence,
the issuer of the first transfer order in the payment transaction,
that is, the beneficiary's debtor, is the "sending customer".
A "payment transaction" is thus facilitated by a string of
separate "transfer orders". Each "transfer order" is "issued" by
its "sender" upon its receipt by the respective "receiver" and is
"executed" when the "receiver", which is a "transmitting bank",
issues a transfer order intended to carry out the respective sender's
transfer order. 63
A bank may initiate a wire transfer to make a payment for its
own account and not for a customer. 64 Such a bank acts then as a
"sending customer" and falls outside the definition of "trans-
mitting bank". 65 By the same token, a bank may be the beneficiary
of a transfer order. Such a bank "is the destination bank as well as
the beneficiary". 66 In connection with transfers between two
accounts of the same entity, such an entity is the "sending
customer" as well as the "beneficiary". 67
61 Since parties to large dollar wire transfers are typically corporate customers, this article
refers to them as "it" or "which", rather than "he", "she" or "who".
62 Paragraphs (i) and (g) respectively.
63 For the time, under those circumstances, when payment is made by the sending customer
to the beneficiary, by the destination bank to the beneficiary, as well as by a sender to a
receiver, see discussion, infra, in Part 3(3).
64 "Customer" is defined in s. 4A-103(1)(b) as "a person having an account with a bank or
from whom a bank agreed to receive transfer orders and includes a bank having an
account with another bank".
65 See definitions in paras. (i) and (k), and the last paragraph of Comment 1 to s. 4A-103.
66 Section 4A-103(1)(c).
67 See the last paragraph of Comment 1 to s. 4A-103. For an example of such a transfer, see
Royal Products Ltd. v. Midland Bank Ltd., [198112 Lloyd's Rep. 194 (Q. B.).
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In general, each "payment transaction" is initiated by a
"transfer order" issued by the "sending customer". Each bank,
not initiating payment for its own account, except for the benefici-
ary's bank (that is, "destination bank") is a "transmitting bank".
There is neither a special name nor definition to what is commonly
known as the "originating bank", that is the first bank to which a
"sending customer" issues a "transfer order". 68 In an in-house
payment or "book transfer", 69 that is, where the "sending
customer" and the "beneficiary" maintain accounts at the same
bank, the bank involved falls into the definition of "destination
bank". It is not a "transmitting bank". 70
An important qualification to the terms "sender" and
''receiver" applies where a transfer order is made by a bank
through a "wire transfer system". Under s. 4A-103(2), such a
system falls outside the definition of "sender" and "receiver".
This provision particularly excludes Federal Reserve Banks acting
as the intermediate "wire transfer system" in FedWire.7t In a
FedWire transfer between a "transferor" and a "transferee"
banks, as defined in the rules governing FedWire, 72 a transfer
order is issued when the transferee's account is credited at its
Reserve Bank.73 "Wire transfer system" is broadly defined in s.
68 See, supra, Introduction (1), text around footnotes 1 and 2.
69 See Case #1 in Comment i to s. 4A-103.
70 Comment 1 to s. 4A-103 uses a series of cases to demonstrate how the terminology of the
section applies to concrete fact situations. Payment is to be made by X to Y. X's account
is with Bank A. Y's account is either with Bank A (Case #1) or with Bank B (Cases #2
and #3). Where Bank A is required to issue a transfer order to Bank B, it can do it either
directly (Case #2), or, in the absence of any correspondent relationship with it, via Bank
C (Case #3).
71 In general for FedWire, see B. Geva, "FedWire Transfer of Funds" (1987), 104 Banking
L.J. 412.
72 These rules are contained in Subpart B of Regulation J., 12 C.F.R. §210, as amended and
supplemented by operating circulars. See Geva, ibid., at p. 413. The "transferor" under
Reg. J. is "sender" under Article 4A, and the "transferee" is "receiver".
73 Thus, under s. 4A-103(2), "[t]he transfer order is issued when final payment is made to
the receiver by the Federal Reserve System." In a FedWire transfer, payment is carried
out essentially by a debit to the sender/transferor's account in its Reserve Bank, payment
message from the sender/transferor's Reserve Bank to the receiver/transferee's Reserve
Bank and credit to the receiver/transferee's account with its Reserve Bank, of which the
receiver/transferee is to be advised. At this point the beneficiary's account with the desti-
nation bank (receiver/transferee) is to be credited. Credit to the receiver/transferee's
account is final as soon as the receiver/transferee's Reserve Bank communicates to the
receiver/transferee of the credit. This is so since a FedWire payment is guaranteed by the
Reserve System. Inasmuch as receipt by the receiver/transferee coincides with credit
given to it by the Reserve Bank, "issue" is defined by reference to such credit and not the
actual receipt (as it is the usual rule under s. 4A-103(1)(e)).
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4A-103(1)(1) to cover all systems "under which a transfer order by
a bank addressed to another bank is transmitted ... for trans-
mission to the bank to which the order is addressed". The
Comment stresses that this definition is broad enough to cover
communication and settlement systems like FedWire and CHIPS,
communication systems like SWIFT, 74 as well as automated
clearing houses processing and transmitting interbank transfer
orders .7
The concluding general provision is s. 4A-105 allowing variation
of the effect of the provisions of Article 4A "by the agreement of
the affected party". Furthermore, a "wire transfer system rule",
broadly defined to mean a Federal Reserve regulation or
operating letter as well as "a rule of a wire transfer system that
governs conduct or defines rights or liabilities of the banks using
the wire system", "may be effective even if it conflicts with a
provision of ... Article [4A]", so as to vary rights and obligations
of a party to a payment transaction, "whether or not the affected
party assents to the rule". The Comment softens the impact of
such wire transfer rules, by explaining, in effect, that by their own
terms provisions relating to the basic structure of Article 4A and
basic rights thereunder 76 may not be superseded by wire transfer
system rules. 77
74 For the distinction between a mere communication wire system and a communication
and settlement system, see Scott, supra, footnote 10, at p. 1669.
75 See Comment 4 to s. 4A-103.
76 Such provisions, which are neither cited nor referred to in the Comment, are s. 4A-
203(5) and 204(5) (rights of a non-bank customer re: authorization of transfer orders
"may be varied only by the agreement of the customer"); 4A-205(4) (a wire transfer
system rule cannot vary the time when acceptance of a transfer order occurs); 4A-206(7)
(a wire transfer system rule may not usually vary the effect of a provision dealing with
revocation or amendment of transfer order); 4A-207(7) (a wire transfer system rule may
not conflict with provisions dealing with allocation of transmittal error losses); 4A-208(4)
(a wire transfer system rule may not conflict with provisions dealing with effect of legal
process and setoff); 4A-303(6) (neither a wire transfer system rule nor an agreement can
be in conflict with subsections providing payment obligations of destination bank to
beneficiary); 4A-304(3) (neither a wire transfer system rule nor an agreement may
conflict with a section providing for the transmitting bank's obligations created by accep-
tance of a transfer order); 4A-307(4) (only "an agreement by the parties" may vary the
measure of recovery by a sending customer or a beneficiary under a section providing for
measure of damages of breach of obligations under Article 4A); and 4A-308(3) (only an
agreement between the sending customer and the beneficiary may vary their respective
rights under a section providing for payment and discharge).
77 This is a substantive deviation from a Previous Draft. Thereunder, in clear rejection of
UCC 4-103(2), and subject only to a possible Federal pre-emption by Federal Reserve
regulations, agreements varying the effect of Article 4A could bind only banks which are
parties to them, and not affect non-consenting customers.
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Part 2: Issue and Acceptance of Transfer Orders
(1) Additional Definitions
The first two sections of Part 2 add a few new definitions.
Section 4A-201(1) defines "wire transfer business day" of a
receiver as that part of the day during which it is open for the
receipt, processing and transmittal of transfer orders. According
to Comment 1, the definition is premised on the fact that wire
transfer business is frequently transacted outside of general
banking hours, so that the definition of "banking day" in UCC 4-
104(1)(c) is inappropriate. 78 The definition designates as "wire
transfer business day" that part of the day wherein all functions of
the receiver, that is receipt, processing and transmittal, and not
only part of them, can be performed. 79
Section 4A-201(2) governs the time when a transfer order is
"received". It does so by stating that this time is determined
according to general rules, that is, "by the rules applicable to
receipt of a notice stated in subsection (27) of Section 1-201".80
The provision goes on to accommodate cut-off times fixed by
receivers, whether uniform or applicable to different senders or
categories of senders, for the handling of transfer orders received
on that day. A transfer order received after such a cut-off point,
"may be treated by the receiver as received at the opening of the
next wire transfer day." This is based on UCC 4-107.81
Section 4A-202 defines "value date" and "execution date".
"Value date" refers to the day the destination bank is to pay the
beneficiary. "Execution date" refers to the day on which the trans-
mitting bank is to issue a transfer order.82 In both cases, it is the
78 "Banking day" is defined in UCC 4-104(1)(c) as "that part of any day on which a bank is
open to the public for carrying on substantially all of its banking functions".
79 Ibid.
80 UCC 1-201(27) provides that:
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is
effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the
attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the
time when it would have been brought to his attention if the organizaton had
exercised due diligence ...
The provision goes on to elaborate on the "due diligence" requirement.
81 And not on UCC 4-203, as stated in Comment 2 to s. 4A-201. Under UCC 4-107, "a bank
may fix an afternoon hour of 2 P.M. or later as a cut-off hour for the handling of money
and items and the making of entries on its books ... Any item or deposit of money
received on any day after a cut-off hour so fixed or after the close of the banking day may
be treated as being received at the opening of the next banking day."
82 For "execution" as an act of the receiver, and "issue", see s. 4A-103(1)(d) and (e).
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day of issue, unless a later date is specified in the transfer order. A
transfer order issued to a transmitting bank does not have to state
a value date. However, where it states a value date later than the
date of its issue, without stating an execution date, "the execution
date is any date that reasonably assures receipt by the destination
bank of a transfer order complying with the sender's transfer order
(i) on the value date, or (ii) in the case of an order payable in a
foreign currency, two days before the value date." Where a date
determined under these rules is not "a wire transfer business
day", 83 the date is postponed to the next day on which a wire
transfer business day of the receiver bank falls.
Under subsec. (3), early or late execution or payment are
effective, though their consequences are determined "in other
provisions of... Article [4A]".
(2) Unauthorized Transfer Orders
Section 4A-203 deals with the customer's liability, presumably
to reimburse its own bank or "receiver", for a payment, made
either without, or after, the receiver's compliance with a "verifi-
cation procedure". 84 A very large percentage of transfer orders
are transmitted electronically and the provision reflects the fact
that under those circumstances it is standard practice to use verifi-
cation procedures to assure that a transfer order is authorized. 85
The provision is premised on the fact that normally, the use of the
agreed verification procedure by the receiver will indicate authori-
zation so as to make the non-bank sending customer liable for the
amount of the order. It then goes on to provide for the case where
no verification procedure was followed, as well as for the case
where even though the agreed upon procedure was followed the
transfer order had not been authorized.
Thus, under s. 4A-203(2), the customer is liable to pay the
amount of a transfer order, even though the receiver accepted it
without complying with a verification procedure, provided that
83 As defined in s. 4A-201(1). See, supra, text around footnote 78.
84 "Verification procedure" is defined in s. 4A-203(1) as:
... a procedure agreed to by a receiver and a customer providing for verification
of transfer orders to the receiver that purport to be those of the customer by the use
in the transmission of those orders of algorithms or other codes or identifying words
or numbers, encryption, callback procedures or other security devices or proce-
dures. Comparison of a signature on a transfer order with an authorized signature
on a signature card is not by itself a verification procedure.
85 See Comment 1.
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"the order is authorized by the customer, or the customer is
otherwise bound pursuant to the law of agency or other applicable
law". Stated otherwise, use of the verification procedure is helpful
for a receiver wishing to be covered by its customer. Nevertheless,
liability is to be fastened on the customer even where no such
procedure has been followed, wherever general principles of law
impose liability. Presumably such general principles may relate to
actual authority, either express or implied, apparent authority, as
well as estoppel.
According to Comment 1, subsec. (2) applies to the case where
no verification procedure is in effect as well as to the case where
the receiver does not comply with the agreed-upon procedure.
The provision is thus premised on the broad principle that no
person is liable on a transfer order unless such person authorized
it. 86
Subsection (2) further provides for a presumption "that the
customer is obliged to pay a transfer order accepted by the
receiver that purports to be the order of the customer". The
presumption may be rebutted by the customer's "substantial
evidence", in which case the burden of proving the customer's
liability is allocated to the receiver.
Subsection (3) deals with an unauthorized payment made after
the receiver's compliance with the verification procedure. To
escape liability under these circumstances, the customer must
prove either that the unauthorized transfer order was initiated by
''a person with access to confidential information obtained from
the receiver", or that the verification procedure "is not a commer-
cially reasonable method of providing security against unautho-
rized transfer orders, [and] acceptance of the transfer order might
reasonably have been prevented if a commercially reasonable
verification procedure had been in effect. ' 87 Stated otherwise,
wrongdoings of a receiver's insiders as well as the quality of the
pertaining verification procedures are within the responsibility of
the receiver institution. In any event, it should be stressed that for
the non-bank sending customer to escape liability under subsec.
(3), the transfer order must be "unauthorized", broadly defined in
relation to "the law of agency and other applicable law". 88 It is
86 UCC Article 3 states this principle, as applied to commercial paper, in a more positive
way. Thus, under UCC 3-401(1), "No person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon."
87 Both phrases are broadly defined and explained in subsec. (4).
88 See also the discussion in the previous paragraph, relating to subsec. (2).
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unclear whether a transfer order, initiated by its own insider, as
opposed to either a receiver's insider or a stranger, can ever
render the non-bank sending customer not liable under s. 4A-
203(3).
No provision in Article 4A fastens upon a customer and its bank
corresponding general duties of care designed to prevent losses
occurring due to unauthorized or materially altered transfer
orders. 89 Arguably, the existence of such duties is to be deter-
mined under general principles of law.90
However, s. 4A-204 provides for corresponding duties of care in
one situation. It requires a non-bank customer to report any
unauthorized transfer order. Under subsec. (2), the duty is
triggered by the receipt by the customer from the receiver of "a
statement describing the customer's purported order". 91 A
customer is required to examine the statement and notify the
receiver "of a lack of authority within a reasonable time". "Rea-
sonable time" is defined as a period within either 15 days after
receiving the statement, or any other "not manifestly unrea-
sonable" period, as fixed by agreement. Upon the failure to
perform that duty, under subsec. (3),
the customer is liable to the receiver for loss resulting from that failure with
respect to the order to which the duty applies and any subsequent unautho-
rized transfer order initiated by the same person, if the subsequent order is
accepted in good faith by the receiver before receiving notification that the
order to which the duty applies was not an authorized order of the customer.
As Comment 3 explains, it is unlikely that a customer's prompt
notification could be made prior to actual payment to the benefi-
ciary. Hence, the customer's liability actually relates to future
transfer orders that would not have been carried out had the first
one been discovered and reported in a timely manner.
Subsection (3) goes on to allow for the reduction, up to the
89 This is unlike UCC 3-406, which, in connection with commercial paper, provides that:
la]ny person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material alter-
ation of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded
from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in due course or
against a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good faith and in accor-
dance with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's
business.
90 Cf. Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas American Bank, 790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir., 1986), recog-
nizing the originating bank's duty of care to the sending customer.
91 " 'Statement' means a writing or an electronic message that can be viewed and the
contents of which are preserved in a record." (s. 4A-204(2)).
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elimination altogether, of the customer's liability thereunder,
depending on the existence and amount of the receiver's own
negligence, as proved by the customer, in not preventing the loss.
Finally, subsec. (4) provides for a limitation period,92 running
from the receipt of the statement describing the unauthorized
transfer order, at the conclusion of which the customer is
precluded from trying to escape liability for the entire amount of
the transfer order, "regardless of fault or lack of fault by either the
customer or the receiver". This appears to apply to each unautho-
rized transfer order separately, as of the original one.
In general, s. 4A-204 is modelled on UCC 4-406, dealing with a
customer's duty to report unauthorized cheques. None the less,
unlike cheque payments, the wire transfer typically involves a
verification procedure designed to confirm its authenticity. 93
Hence, s. 4A-204 is of limited application. 94 Under subsec. (1), it
applies only "if (i) a receiver in good faith accepts a transfer order
that purports to be the order of a customer, and (ii) the customer is
not liable to pay the order under subsection (2) or (3) of Section 4A-
203" (emphasis added). According to Comment 2, the typical
cases to which the provision applies are those in which the receiver
is relying on a spurious telephone call, letter, telex or other written
communication, purporting to be the customer's transfer order. In
general, the provision "applies only to cases in which no commer-
cially reasonable verification procedure is in effect, to cases in
which the receiver did not comply with a commercially reasonable
verification procedure that was in effect, or to cases in which the
customer avoids liability" by proving that the spurious transfer
order was initiated by an insider with the receiver. 95 Compliance
with a commercially reasonable verification procedure will protect
the receiver, except for the case of an unauthorized transfer order
initiated at its own end,96 without the need to invoke s. 4A-204.
Anglo-Canadian law has not recognized the existence of a non-
statutory duty on the part of a bank customer to detect and
prevent cheque forgeries,97 unless provided for by contract. 98 It is
92 Whose length is not specified in the section. A Previous Draft prescribed a one-year
limitation period.
93 See discussion on s. 4A-203, supra, text around footnotes 84 to 88.
94 See Comment 1 to s. 4A-204.
95 Comment 2. To this one may add the unlikely case of payment, notwithstanding
compliance with a verification procedure that failed to authorize the transfer. Of course,
particularly in such a case (but in fact in all instances enumerated in the Comment), the
bank may lose due to its own negligence (s. 4A-204(3)).
96 Under s. 4A-203(3)(a), discussed, supra, in text around footnote 87.
97 See Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd., [1985] 3 W.L.R. 317 (P.C.);
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thus unlikely that a comparable duty of care will be fastened by
courts in Canada on a bank customer in connection with wire
transfers.
(3) Acceptance and Rejection
Acceptance and rejection of transfer orders are dealt with in
s. 4A-205. According to the Comment,99 the sender's transfer
order is treated in that provision as a request made by the sender
to the receiver to execute or pay the order. The receiver may
either accept or reject this request. Acceptance and rejection are
mutually exclusive opposites. In general, prompt action by the
receiver, responding to the sender's request, is expected. Accep-
tance of the transfer order creates a contract and imposes obliga-
tions on the receiver. These obligations are governed by ss. 4A-
303 and 304.100 They run either in the sender's favour, where the
receiver is a transmitting bank, or in favour of the beneficiary, if
the receiver is the destination bank.
Under s. 4A-205(1), a transfer order is accepted by the receiver
at the earliest of the following four times:
(a) When the receiver, which is a transmitting bank, executes the
order. Under s. 4A-103(1)(d), such "execution" occurs when
the receiver "issues a transfer order intended to carry out the
sender's transfer order".
(b) When the receiver, which is the destination bank, "notifies the
beneficiary of (i) receipt of the order or (ii) credit to the
account of the beneficiary with respect to the order, unless the
notice indicates that the destination bank is rejecting the order
or that payment of, or release of funds with respect to, the
order by the destination bank will not be made until receipt of
settlement from the sender of the order."
(c) Where the sender is a bank, the receiver is the destination
bank, and the order provides for payment to an account with
the destination bank, "at the time the sender pays its
and Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 711, 40 D.L.R.
(4th) 385.
98 Arrow Transfer Co. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1972] S.C.R. 845, 27 D.L.R. (3d)
81, implied such a duty from a standard verification clause in the account agreement.
English courts require the duty to be expressly provided for in the bank-customer
agreement. See Tai Hing Cotton Mill, supra, footnote 97.
99 See, in general, Comments 1 and 9.
100 Discussed, infra, in Part 3(1).
1988]
206 Canadian Business Law Journal
obligation stated in subsection (2) of Section 4A-302". The
latter provides that the sender's obligation to pay to the
receiver the amount of the order arises upon the acceptance of
the transfer order.
At first blush, (c) seems to be circular: acceptance by the
receiver occurs under s. 4A-205(1)(c) upon the sender's payment
made according to an obligation arising under s. 4A-302(2), upon
the receiver's acceptance. Nevertheless, subsec. (1)(c) is appar-
ently designed to encompass those situations where payment by
the sending transmitting bank to the destination bank, far from
fulfilling an obligation arising from the receiver's acceptance, in
fact generates the receiver's acceptance. Indeed, according to
Comment 4 to s. 4A-205, subsec. (1)(c) covers a FedWire transfer
of funds as well as a mistaken payment by the destination bank to
the wrong beneficiary. In the former case, that of a FedWire
transfer of funds, under s. 4A-302(3), the sender pays the receiver
as soon as the receiver obtains FedWire settlement. 1 1 Under
FedWire Rules, 10 2 FedWire settlement is marked by the receiver
obtaining final credit to its account with its Federal Reserve
Bank. 10 3 Under s. 4A-103(2), such final credit is tantamount to the
issuance of the transfer order. 1°4 "Thus, acceptance occurs when
the FedWire is issued",10 5 that is, before the beneficiary is notified
so as to bring upon acceptance under para. (b).
In the latter case, that of a mistaken payment by the destination
bank to the wrong beneficiary, the true beneficiary is never
notified so as to generate acceptance under para. (b). Therefore,
the effect of s. 4A-302(3) is that the interbank settlement, usually
forthcoming at the end of the day, will result in payment under s.
4A-302(2), 106 so as to generate acceptance under s. 4A-205(1)(c).
In short, the underlying rationale of para. (c) is that a receiver may
not reject a transfer order for which it has been paid. Accordingly,
payment by the sender triggers acceptance by the receiver.
The combined effect of paras. (b) and (c) is that in any transfer
other than a "book transfer", 10 7 acceptance by the destination
101 Section 4A-302 is discussed, infra, in Part 3(3).
102 See, supra, footnote 72.
103 This is explained in Comment 4 to s. 4A-205. See Geva, supra, footnote 71, at p. 428.
104 See, supra, text and footnote 73.
105 Comment 4 to s. 4A-205.
106 In fact, subject to subsec. (2) discussed below, any inaction will result in midnight accep-
tance under para. (d).
107 That is, payment by a "sending customer" to a "beneficiary" maintaining accounts with
the same bank. See, supra, text around footnote 69.
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bank occurs either by its notification to the beneficiary or by its
receipt of payment from the sending transmitting bank. The
sender's payment will precede the notification to the beneficiary in
FedWire and in the case of a mistaken payment to the wrong
beneficiary, as well as whenever the destination bank chooses to
delay notification or its effect, and thereby payment, to that
point. 108 None the less, the destination bank's power to delay
acceptance by withholding notification may be of short duration.
Large-dollar wire systems in the U.S. normally provide for same-
day settlement. 1°9 Hence, the sender's payment is likely to be
forthcoming on the day of the receipt of the transfer order by the
destination bank.
The fourth milestone'10 for the occurrence of acceptance under
s. 4A-205(1) is
(d) At midnight of either the execution or value date of the
order,"' depending on whether the receiver is a transmitting
bank or the destination bank. But no acceptance is to take
place under subsec. (1)(d) unless the receiver has been paid or
has access to funds that can provide payment.
This paragraph reverses the rule of Houston Contracting Co. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank. 112 This case held that the receiver's failure
to respond to a transfer order by midnight of the day of its issuance
was not tantamount to an acceptance. 113 It did not charge the
receiver with liability whatsoever.
Since an interbank settlement will usually be accomplished
before midnight, subsec. (1)(d) will normally apply only to a
receiver which is a transmitting bank and not a destination bank.
The only case in which subsec. (1)(d) applies to the destination
bank is that in which the sender is a sending customer, i.e., a book
transfer. 114 Subsection (2) adds two qualifications to the scope of
subsec. (1)(d):
108 "Acceptance" by the destination bank marks its "payment" obligation to the benefi-
ciary. See s. 4A-303(2), discussed, infra, in Part 3(1).
109 See, in general, B. Geva, "Daylight Overdrafts and Settlement Failure - Credit Risk
Controls in U.S. Wire Systems" (1987), 3 Bank L. Bull. (Aust.) 33.
110 See, supra, paragraph which follows the one containing footnote 100.
111 See respective definitions in s. 4A-202, discussed, supra, in Part 2(1).
112 539 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y., 1985).
113 The court held that UCC 4-302(a), requiring a bank to respond to the presentment of
"an item" by "midnight deadline" at a penalty of being "accountable" for its amount
upon its failure to do so, did not apply to wire transfers. "Midnight deadline" is defined
in UCC 4-104(1)(h) as the midnight on the next banking day following the banking day
of the receipt of an item.
114 Comment 5 to s. 4A-205.
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[i] No acceptance occurs under subsection (1)(d) if the sender is not
reasonably identified in the order or has no contract or course of dealing with
the receiver that would reasonably cause the sender to expect that the
receiver would execute or pay the order. [ii] If a transfer order has not been
accepted by midnight of the execution date or value date of the order, accep-
tance cannot occur thereafter under subsection (1)(d).
In short, subsec. (1)(d) does not apply to an out-of-ordinary-
course transfer order, as well as where funds are made available to
the receiver after the midnight deadline. Where the receiver is
instructed to execute or pay the order at a future date, subsec.
(1)(d) applies to that future date. 115
Under subsec. (3), rejection is to be accomplished "by giving
notice of rejection to the sender". Rejection is effective either
"when notice is given if given by any means that is commercially
reasonable", or "[i]n any other case ... when notice is received by
the sender". No comprehensive test for commercial reasona-
bleness is provided, but it is stated, as a general rule of thumb, that
notice of rejection given by the same means used by the sender in
transmitting the transfer order is commercially reasonable.
Comment 8 gives the following example: a sender using first class
mail cannot reasonably expect the receiver to use a more
expensive means such as telex or telephone. Subsection 3 further
provides that suspension of payments by a receiver is tantamount
to automatic and immediate rejection, which does not require
notice to be given. In general, acceptance and rejection are
opposites that are mutually exclusive: 116 "Rejection precludes a
subsequent acceptance and acceptance precludes a subsequent
rejection., 117
In summary, a receiver is expected to respond promptly to a
transfer order, at least by rejecting it. Normally both acceptance
and rejection requires action. Inaction may result in midnight
acceptance under subsec. (1)(d), usually by a transmitting bank,
but not under all circumstances. Upon receiving settlement,
usually shortly after the closing of the business day, a non-
rejecting destination bank may find out that by its inaction it has in
fact accepted the transfer order.
115 Comments 6 and 7, ibid.
116 Comment 9, ibid.
117 Subsection (3).
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(4) Revocation, Amendment and Transmittal Errors
The revocation and amendment of transfer orders is governed
by s. 4A-206. In principle, revocation or amendment can be either
both effective and rightful, or ineffective altogether. There is no
intermediate concept of wrongful revocation or amendment. 118
The general rule is provided for in subsec. (1). The sender may
revoke or amend a transfer order unilaterally, by a communi-
cation to the receiver. The communication may be oral, written or
electronic. It must be received "at a time and in a manner
affording the receiver a reasonable opportunity to act on it (i)
before execution of the order if the receiver is a transmitting bank,
or (ii) acceptance of the order if the receiver is the destination
bank." Stated otherwise, a wire transfer cannot be used as a
deferred payment machinery. 119 While it may state an execution
date which is later than the day it is issued, 120 until its execution it
can be revoked unilaterally.
In identifying either "execution" or "acceptance", depending
on whether the receiver is a transmitting bank or the destination
bank, as the cutoff point for the unilateral revocation or
amendment, Article 4A introduces certainty to a quite unsettled
area of the law of wire transfers. 121 Revocability is thus determined
by a clear and well defined act of the immediate receiver and not
by vague tests relating to a receiver's internal process. Nor is
revocability lost to the sender too soon, that is, upon the mere
receipt of the transfer order by the immediate receiver.
Subsection (1) of s. 4A-206 is modelled on UCC 4-403 providing
for a customer's right to stop payment of "any item payable for his
account", including his cheques. 122 There is however no provision
in Article 4A, corresponding to that of UCC 4-407, dealing with
the parties' respective positions upon the receiver's wrongful
payment, that is upon its failure to comply with an effective
revocation or amendment of a transfer order. 123 Perhaps subsec.
118 See Comment 1 to s. 4A-206.
119 Cf. E.P. Ellinger, "Electronic Funds Transfer as a Deferred Settlement System", in
R.M. Goode, ed., Electronic Banking: The Legal Implications (London, Institute of
Bankers, and Centre for Commercial Law Studies of Queen Mary College, 1985), p. 29.
120 Cf. s. 4A-201(1), discussed, supra, in Part 2(1).
121 For the confusion re: "finality of payment" see, supra, Introduction (2).
122 Cf. Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5, as amended, s. 167(a).
123 In such a case, "to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to
prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item", the paying bank is subro-
gated to the position of a holder in due course, the payee on the transaction, and the
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(4), providing for the retroactive effect of any revocation or
amendment, may suggest that the improper act is null and void so
as to require a complete restoration of the status quo. At the same
time, so far as certainty is concerned, the current state of the
common law governing the recovery of mistaken bank payments
may not be promising. 124
After the execution of the order, the revocation or amendment
of a transfer order given to a transmitting bank can be made in
limited circumstances. It can be made by the sender, under subsec.
(2), only "if the receiver agrees or a wire transfer system rule
allows revocation or amendment without agreement of the
receiver". In any event, in such a case, "no revocation or
amendment is possible unless all transfer orders issued by subse-
quent transmitting banks to carry out the order to be revoked or
amended are also revoked or amended to comply." Similarly,
under subsec. (3), after acceptance, where the receiver is the desti-
nation bank, the transfer order can be revoked or amended by the
sender but only with the consent of the receiver or under a wire
transfer system rule dispensing with such consent.
Even so, revocation or amendment of a transfer order that has
been accepted by the destination bank can be made "only if
necessary to correct a mistake by the sender, or by a previous
sender in the payment transaction, which resulted or would result
in payment to a beneficiary that is not entitled to retain the entire
payment under the law governing mistake and restitution".
Revocation (but not amendment) made by the destination bank
under such circumstances either discharges the destination bank
from its obligation to pay the beneficiary, or, where payment has
already been made, entitles this bank to recover from the benefi-
ciary any amount to which the beneficiary is not entitled, under
the law governing mistake and restitution. Obviously, under these
circumstances, both discharge and right to recover presuppose
that payment would have been mistaken, that is, that the benefi-
ciary is in fact not entitled to receive it from the sending customer.
Where this assumption turns out to be erroneous and the benefi-
ciary is held to be entitled to payment, the receiving bank is
drawer. In short, as against any plaintiff, the bank may assert defences based on that
plaintiffs benefit derived from the payment.
124 For a recent exposition of this law see M.H. Ogilvie, "Recovery of Money Paid Under
Mistake of Fact: When the Bank Loses" (1987), 1 B.F.L.R. 413.
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exposed to substantial risks for consenting to the revocation or
amendment of the transfer order.
Indeed, a receiving bank is under no obligation to consent to
revocation or amendment under subsecs. (2) and (3).125 However,
under subsec. (4), where the receiver either consents or is bound
by a wire transfer system rule and where the revocation or
amendment is not effective, the sender is made liable to the
receiving bank for any loss or expenses.125a Subsection (4) applies
to a receiver which is either a transmitting bank or destination
bank.
Subsection (4) further provides for the retroactive effect of
revocation or amendment. Subsection (5) provides, in line with
UCC 4-405(1), that neither death nor legal incapacity of the
sender by itself revokes a transfer order. This is true unless the
incapacitating event comes to the receiver's attention in circum-
stances allowing it "reasonable opportunity to act on it" prior to
acceptance (by a receiver which is the destination bank) or
execution (by a receiver which is a transmitting bank). 126
Subsection (6) of s. 4A-206 may be described, by analogy to a
corresponding concept from letter of credit law, as providing for
the autonomy of the payment obligation of the destination bank.
The provision does not allow a court to enjoin a destination bank
from releasing funds to the beneficiary. 127 The prohibition is not
stated to be limited to the post acceptance stage. Presumably, no
injunction can be issued even prior to acceptance. Two specific
exceptions are enumerated: (i) a mistaken payment as provided
for in subsec. (3), and (ii) where "the payment was ordered as the
result of fraud." The former is designed to reinforce the policy
against the completion of a mistaken payment, as reflected in
subsec. (3), in circumstances where the destination bank is either
unwilling to incur the risk associated with consenting to the
sender's revocation or amendment or is not bound to incur such a
risk by a wire transfer system rule. The latter is reminiscent of the
125 See also Comment 3 to s. 4A-206.
125a Compensable "loss or expenses" include "reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation incurred by the receiver as a result of the attempted revocation or
amendment". Ibid.
126 Cf. Bills of Exchange Act, s. 167(b).
127 Nevertheless, "the destination bank incurs no liability for failure to release funds to the
beneficiary while enjoined from doing so even if the injunction is issued in violation of
this subsection." See s. 4A-206(6).
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fraud exception to the autonomy of the letter of credit. Unfortu-
nately, it carries with it the same uncertainty of scope. For
example, it is unclear whether the fraud must be on the originating
bank, 128 or on the beneficiary.
According to Comment 4, the effect of the injunction is to
suspend the destination bank's obligation to pay the beneficiary.
Due to the speed with which wire transfers are normally carried
out, the view expressed in the Comment is that "it is not likely that
there will be many cases in which a sender would be successful in
obtaining injunctive relief which was timely."
Section 4A-207 governs risk allocation where an error occurs in
the course of transmitting a transfer order which has not been
effectively revoked or enjoined under s. 4A-206.
Under s. 4A-207(1), the risk of transmitting a transfer order by
means of a wire transfer system or other communication system,
including a telegraph company as well as a processing centre,
1 29
usually falls on the immediate sender. Where the terms of the
transfer order received by the receiver from such a system differ
from the original terms of the transfer order as communicated by
the sender to the system, the sender's responsibilities are usually
determined by the terms of the transfer order received by the
receiver. Thus, upon the occurrence of such a transformation in
the content of the transfer order, "the sender issues a transfer
order to the receiver when the receiver receives the order trans-
mitted by the wire transfer or communication system, and the
terms of the sender's order are those of the order received by the
receiver." Except that "if the discrepancy could have been
detected by proper utilization by the receiver of error-detection
procedures in force, the terms of the sender's order are those
transmitted by the sender to the wire transfer or communication
system." The provision applies whenever a transfer order is
communicated to the receiver by means of an intermediary, and is
not issued by a sender to a receiver directly by delivery of a writing
or electronic device or by an oral or electronic communication.
130
Where the risk falls on the sender, its remedy against the interme-
diary wire or communication system is not provided for in Article
4A.131 The respective positions of the sending customer, the
128 An undefined term, denoting the first transmitting bank, that is, the sending customer's
bank. See, supra, text and footnote 68.
129 See Comment 1 to s. 4A-207.
130 Ibid.
131 According to Comment 1, ibid., the remedy "will depend upon the contract between the
sender and the telegraph company."
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beneficiary, any transmitting bank, and the destination bank, are
governed by subsecs. (2) to (6) of s. 4A-207. These provisions
cover errors occurring in the course of the transmittal of transfer
orders carrying out a payment transaction. They apply
irrespective of whether the pertaining transfer order was commu-
nicated directly to a receiver or via an intermediary wire or
communication system. As well, they apply regardless of the place
where the error occurs, that is, whether at a bank or an interme-
diary wire or communication system. In short, subsecs. (2) to (6)
apply to a broader range of circumstances than those governed by
subsec. (1).
Subsection (2) deals with the situation where "a transmitting
bank executes the transfer order of a sender (i) by issuing
duplicate transfer orders, or (ii) by issuing a transfer order in an
amount greater than the amount of the sender's order, and (iii) the
error causes the destination bank ... to accept a transfer order or
orders in an amount greater than the amount of the transfer order
of the sender." This situation generates three results:
(i) Payment by the sending customer to the beneficiary is limited
to the original amount, as specified in the sending customer's
transfer order.
(ii) The erring transmitting bank "may recover the excess
payment from the beneficiary to the extent that the law
governing mistake and restitution allows recovery". 132
(iii)The erring transmitting bank is liable to pay the transfer
order/s issued by it but is entitled to receive payment from the
sender in the amount of the sender's order.
The initial risk thus falls on the erring transmitting bank. It is
not entitled to recover the excess from a previous party and, at the
same time, is liable to any subsequent bank for the amount of its
own transfer order. While it is true that the erring transmitting
bank has the right to recover the excess from the beneficiary, the
beneficiary is not its own customer, and may be located far away.
Furthermore, defences available to the beneficiary under the law
governing mistake and restitution may arise from its relationship
with its immediate payor, that is, the destination bank, so as to be
beyond the control of the erring transmitting bank. 133
132 Stated otherwise, the transmitting bank's right is not absolute. It is subject to the
defences that the beneficiary may raise under the law governing mistake and restitution.
133 A similar result to that of subsec. (2) was reached at common law in Walker v. Texas
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Subsection (3) of s. 4A-207 deals with the situation where "a
transmitting bank executes the transfer order of a sender (i) by
issuing a transfer order in an amount less than the amount of the
sender's order, and (ii) the error of the transmitting bank causes
the destination bank ... to accept a transfer order in the amount of
the transfer order of the transmitting bank." In such a case,
payment by the destination bank to the beneficiary has been
carried out in the smaller amount. The immediate sender's
liability and that of each previous sender is then limited to the
smaller amount. So far as Article 4A is concerned, the only
balance to be restored is that relating to a previous sender which
paid the full original amount of a transfer order accepted by it
prior to the error: "A previous sender that has overpaid is entitled
to recover the overpayment from the receiver that accepted the
sender's transfer order." Under these circumstances, recovery is
from a bank, and perhaps for that reason it is not made subject to
the law governing mistake and restitution. 134
When the beneficiary of the transfer order of a transmitting
bank accepted by the destination bank is different from the benefi-
ciary of the transfer order of the sending customer, the situation is
governed by subsec. (4). In such a case, "no payment to the
beneficiary of the order of the transmitting bank is made by the
sending customer." The transmitting bank may recover the
ultimate beneficiary "to the extent that the law governing mistake
and restitution allows recovery". 135
Subsection (5) of s. 4A-207 governs the situation of a transfer
order issued to the destination bank, in which either (i) the named
beneficiary, bank account number or other identification of the
beneficiary refers to a non-existing person or account, or (ii) the
name of the beneficiary does not correspond to the account
number so that both "identify different persons". In such cases,
"no person, except the beneficiary intended by the sending
customer ... has rights as a beneficiary of the order." Where "no
person has rights as a beneficiary", that is, where the beneficiary
on the received transfer order is non-existent, "acceptance of the
order is not possible". Upon paying "a person that has no rights as
Commerce Bank, 635 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Tex., 1986). The case also demonstrates that
the originating bank's recovery rights against the beneficiary may be worthless. After it
had been paid, the beneficiary in that case became insolvent.
134 See also, supra, footnote 132 and text around it.
135 See, supra, footnote 132.
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a beneficiary", the destination bank is entitled to recover from
that person the amount paid, "to the extent that the law governing
mistake and restitution allows recovery". 136
The provision allocates the risk of such a wrongful payment to
the destination bank. Though the error may have been committed
by the sending customer, the risk does not fall on that party, but on
that bank situated in the best position to discover the error. As
explained by Comment 5,
If its order, because of an internal inconsistency, does not allow the benefi-
ciary to be identified by the destination bank, Sending Customer can
reasonably expect that the order will be rejected ... By specifically identi-
fying the person whose account is to be credited Sending Customer can
protect itself. By executing a transfer order in which the beneficiary is
described by both a name and an account number, the destination bank
assumes the burden of ascertaining that the person paid fits the description.
Subsection (5) appears to codify the result of Securities Fund
Services, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. 137 In that
case, the sending customer was fraudulently induced by a third
party to issue a transfer order designating a beneficiary and
account number that did not match. The destination bank credited
the designated account, thereby implementing the third party's
fraudulent scheme. The court held for the sending customer, and
allocated the loss to the destination bank on the grounds of an
implied duty of care owed by the destination bank to the sending
customer under an implied agency relationship. It seems however
that when the transfer order issued to the originating bank is
altogether unauthorized, as distinguished from one procured by
fraud, s. 4A-207(5) is superseded by s. 4A-203 dealing with
unauthorized transfer orders. 138
A sending customer choosing a wire payment premised on
speedy automated processing may lose the protection afforded to
it by subsec. (5). Thus, subsec. (5) is explicitly stated to be super-
seded by subsec. (6). The latter applies to a transfer order issued
to a destination bank that is transmitted "by use of a standard
machine-readable format to facilitate the automated processing of
136 Compare with footnote 132.
137 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill., 1982).
138 Discussed, supra, in Part 2(2). Again, this apparently codifies the common law position.
Cf. Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas American Bank, 790 F. 2d 407 (5th Cir., 1986), where
the destination bank escaped liability, as against the originating bank, for crediting an
account number which did not match with the beneficiary's name, where the sending
customer's transfer order was forged.
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the order by the destination bank", and that "identifies the benefi-
ciary both by an identifying or bank account number and by
name". Subsection (6) then applies when "the name and number
identify different persons" and the sender has notice "that
payment will be made on the basis of the identifying or bank
account number".
Under those circumstances, where "the destination bank paid
the person identified by the identifying or bank account number",
which was not the named beneficiary, notwithstanding subsec. (5),
"[tihe beneficiary of the transfer order issued to the destination
bank is the person identified by the identifying or bank account
number", and not the one identified by name. Therefore, if the
transfer order is accepted by the destination bank, its sender is
obliged to pay. It is entitled to be reimbursed by a previous sender
communicating the erroneous information. But a previous sender
that "did not have notice that payment would be made solely on
the basis of that number" is specifically protected. The first liable
sender may recover payment from the wrongful beneficiary,
provided that under "the law governing mistake and restitution"
that beneficiary is not entitled to retain the payment, and "to the
extent that the law governing mistake and restitution allows
recovery".
At this juncture, several observations on the scope of s. 4A-207
are in order. First, subsecs. (2) to (6) do not cover errors
generated either within the sending customer's organization, or at
an intermediary wire transfer or communication system employed
by it to transmit the transfer order to the originating bank.
Secondly, errors giving rise to situations falling under s. 4A-207
may be either committed in good faith or perpetuated fraudu-
lently. Thirdly, an erroneous payment may affect the respective
liabilities of the sending customer and beneficiary on their under-
lying contract. In general this aspect, as well as the possible
recourse against a bank responsible for the error, is outside the
scope of s. 4A-207.
(5) Creditor Process and the Transfer Order
Section 4A-208 deals with situations where a receiver is served
with notice of creditor process, such as levy, attachment or
garnishment, 139 with regard to either the sender's or beneficiary's
139 Under subsec. (1), "creditor process" is used in s. 4A-208 to mean "levy, attachment,
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account. The provision is further concerned with the destination
bank's setoff right.
Subsection (2) deals with the situation in which the receiver is
served with notice of creditor process relating to the sender's
account. It is concerned with the receiver's right to charge the
sender's account with respect to the sender's transfer order.
Normally, the "receiver" and "sender" are likely to be the origi-
nating bank 140 and the "sending customer" respectively. In the
typical case, there will not be sufficient funds in the sender's
account to cover both the transfer order and the creditor process.
Subsection (2) thus provides that "the receiver may charge the
account with respect to the transfer order, notwithstanding service
of the creditor process, unless the service is made at a time and in a
manner affording the receiver a reasonable opportunity to act on it
before the receiver accepts the transfer order." Stated otherwise,
a timely received notice of creditor process defeats the receiver's
right to debit the sender's account with the amount of a transfer
order that has not been accepted yet. Practically speaking, the
respective transfer order may not be executed then. 141
Subsection (2) deals neither with the originating bank's 142 setoff
right upon receiving the sending customer's transfer order, nor
with the effect on that right, under those circumstances, of
creditor process. However, according to Comment 3, other provi-
sions of Article 4A allow the originating bank to decline to carry
out its sending customer's transfer order and instead exercise its
setoff right with respect to the balance at the sending customer's
account. Comment 3 further explains that the effect of creditor
process on the originating bank's setoff right is governed by state
law which may provide that a creditor serving legal process takes
subject to the bank's right of setoff.
Subsection (3) governs the destination bank's 143 right of setoff
and creditor process served on it with respect to the beneficiary's
account. It provides in para. (a), that until a transfer order is
accepted by the destination bank, the amount credited to the
garnishment, notice of lien, sequestration, or similar process issued by or on behalf of a
creditor or other claimant with respect to an account".
140 An undefined term, denoting the first transmitting bank, that is, the sending customer's
bank. See Part 1, supra, text and footnote 68.
141 "Acceptance" by a transmitting bank is marked by "execution". See s. 4A-205(1)(a).
142 See, supra, footnote 140.
143 The term is not explicitly mentioned in the subsection. But see Comment 4 to s. 4A-208.
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beneficiary's account is not subject to the destination bank's setoff
right as well as to the creditor process. No funds may be withdrawn
by the beneficiary with respect to the transfer order, "if notice of
creditor process is served [on the destination bank] at a time and in
a manner affording [it] a reasonable opportunity to act on it before
withdrawal of the credit". Whether the bank's setoff right comes
ahead of the creditor process is not explicitly stated. 144
In some states, creditor process applies not only to existing
debts but also to future debts, that is, also to debts of the desti-
nation bank to the beneficiary arising after service is made. 145 For
such states, subsec. (3)(b) provides that having been served with
notice of creditor process "at a time and in a manner affording [it]
a reasonable opportunity to act on it", a receiver "may not right-
fully reject [a] transfer order, except for an irregularity in [it]".
The destination bank is not permitted to protect its customer by
defeating the creditor process. 146
Part 3: Liabilities of Parties and Payment
(1) Acceptance
Under s. 4A-301, acceptance marks the point in time where the
receiver incurs liability with respect to a transfer order. 147 An
agreement, and occasionally provisions of Article 4A, may impose
obligations on a receiver with respect to a transfer order, "but
liability based on acceptance does not arise until acceptance
occurs pursuant to Section 4A-205". The receiver's liability is
exclusively contractual: 148 "A receiver is not the agent of the
sender of the transfer order that it accepted, or of the beneficiary
of the order, or of any previous sender in the payment
transaction."1 49
The sender's obligation created by the acceptance of a transfer
order is governed by s. 4A-302. In general, the rules provided in
that section are explicitly stated in subsec. (1) to be subject to the
provisions of s. 4A-207, governing erroneous transfer orders, 150 of
144 But see the last paragraph to Comment 5 in a Previous Draft: "The normal result under
general state law is that a garnishment order is subject to a right of setoff by the bank."
145 Comment 5 to s. 4A-208.
146 Ibid.
147 What constitutes "acceptance" is governed by s. 4A-205, discussed, supra, in Part 2(3).
148 See Comment to s. 4A-301.
149 Section 4A-301.
150 These provisions are dealt with, supra, in Part 2(4).
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s. 4A-307, governing the scope of liability under Article 4A,151 and
those of s. 4A-309, dealing with the failure of a transmitting
bank. 152
Acceptance by the receiver is not only a source of obligations
and liabilities. It also generates rights. Thus, under s. 4A-302(2),
upon the acceptance of a transfer order, the sender becomes
obligated to the receiver "to pay the amount of the order", except
that this obligation does not arise prior to either the execution date
or value date, depending on whether the receiver is a transmitting
bank or the destination bank.1 53 The sender's obligation enures
solely to the benefit of the receiver. 154
This may settle two common law controversies. First, the
irrevocability of telex instructions received by a bank in the course
of a wire transfer has never been established in English law. 155 In
the United States, such irrevocability was judicially recognized
but only in connection with transfer orders governed by specific
wire transfer system rules. 156 Secondly, whether the sender's
obligation enures also to the benefit of third parties besides the
receiver, such as the beneficiary, has not been judicially resolved
in the United States, where the transfer order has been regarded
as effecting the assignment of funds to the beneficiary. 157 Both
points have been settled by s. 4A-302(2): acceptance of the
transfer note generates a binding obligation but only to the
receiver.
The destination bank's obligation created by acceptance of a
transfer order is governed by s. 4A-303.15 8 Under subsec. (2), the
accepting destination bank "is obligated to the beneficiary to pay
the amount of the order". The precise timing of that obligation is
made dependent under subsec. (4) on the manner of
acceptance:159
151 These provisions are dealt with, infra, in Part 3(2).
152 These provisions are dealt with, infra, in Part 3(4).
153 For pertinent terminology, see s. 4A-202, discussed, supra, Part 2(1).
154 See Comment 2 to s. 4A-302.
155 See, e.g., The Brimnes, Tenax Steamship Co. Ltd. v. The Brimnes (Owners), [1974] 3
All E.R. 88 (C.A.), at pp. 111-12,per Megaw L.J.
156 Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 609 F. 2d 1047 (2nd Cir., 1979),
giving effect to the irrevocability of CHIPS transfers under CHIPS Rules.
157 See, in general, Introduction (2), supra. A leading American authority supporting the
assignment theory is Delbrueck, supra, footnote 156.
158 Like s. 4A-302, s. 4A-303 is explicitly stated, in subsec. (1), to be subject to "Sections
4A-207, 4A-305 and 4A-309". Compare with text and footnotes 150 to 152, supra.
159 See, supra, cross reference in footnote 147.
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(i) If acceptance occurred under s. 4A-205(1)(b), that is, by
notification to the beneficiary of the receipt of the order,
"payment is due on the day of acceptance", except that if the
value date of the order is after the day acceptance occurs and
the notice provides for payment on the value date, payment is
due on the value date.
(ii) If acceptance occurred under s. 4A-205(1)(c), that is, by
means of the sender's payment to the receiver, "payment is
due on the day of acceptance", except that if the receiver's
acceptance occurred after the close of the receiver's wire
transfer business day, 160 "payment is due on the receiver's next
wire transfer business day".
(iii)If acceptance occurred under s. 4A-205(1)(d), that is midnight
of value date where the sender either paid or provided funds to
the receiver, "payment is due on the destination bank's next
wire transfer business day following the value date".
In connection with acceptance under s. 4A-205(1)(c) and (d),
"the destination bank is required to give notice to the beneficiary
of receipt of the transfer order before midnight of the day on
which payment is due."
The obligations created by the acceptance of a transfer order by
a transmitting bank are governed by s. 4A-304. The specific under-
takings are provided in subsec. (1). Subsection (2) expands the list
of those entitled to enforce some of subsec. (1) undertakings.
Subsection (2) further expands such transmitting bank's under-
takings with respect to the conduct of subsequent transmitting
banks.
Subsection (1) fastens three undertakings upon a receiver which
is a transmitting bank in connection with its acceptance of a
transfer order:
(a) The receiver warrants to the sender that the destination bank
will accept a transfer order carrying out the sender's order.
(b) Upon the execution of the sender's order by the receiver, the
receiver warrants to the sender "that the time of execution of
the sender's order and the terms of the transfer order issued by
the receiver comply with the sender's order". This can be
characterized as a warranty relating to the receiver's own
compliance with the sender's instructions.
160 See definition in s. 4A-201(1), discussed, supra, in Part 2(1).
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(c) Upon acceptance under s. 4A-205(1)(d), that is, by the
passage of the midnight of the execution date, the receiver
which either fails altogether to execute the order or delays its
execution, becomes liable either for the failure to execute or
the unexcused delay, as the case may be.161
Under subsec. (2), liability of every transmitting bank, whether
or not it is the originating bank, is "for the benefit of the sending
customer". In turn, the sending customer may recover either
directly from the breaching bank, or from "any intermediate
transmitting bank". Damages for conduct "in malicious disregard
of the rights" of the sending customer, where applicable, 62 may be
recovered by the sending customer only from the breaching bank.
In general, a transmitting bank that pays damages for breach by
another transmitting bank is entitled to be reimbursed by the
breaching bank.
The overall impact of s. 4A-304 is that, in general, a trans-
mitting bank is responsible to a prior party as to the carrying out of
the payment instructions by itself as well as by any subsequent
party. Common law vicarious liability, and the prevailing
American doctrine eliminating privity requirements, are codified
and further bolstered, as liability may not be contracted out. 163
(2) Miscellaneous Contractual Aspects
Under s. 4A-305, the failure to execute a transfer order, an
execution that takes place after the execution date, or late
payment or notice of payment to the beneficiary may be excused
"if the receiver proves that the failure or delay was caused by ...
circumstances beyond [its] control ... and [it] exercised such
diligence as the circumstances required". A non-exhaustive list of
"circumstances beyond the control of the receiver" includes
"interruption of communication facilities or equipment failure not
involving a lack of ordinary care by the receiver, suspension of
payments by another bank, 64 war, [and] emergency
conditions". 165
161 But such liability is not absolute. See s. 4A-205(1)(d) and (2), dealt with, supra, in the
text around footnotes 111 to 115, and s. 4A-305, discussed, infra, in Part 3(2).
162 See s. 4A-307(3) discussed, infra, in Part 3(2).
163 Compare in general with Introduction (2).
164 Under UCC 4-104(1)(k), explicitly adopted by reference in s. 4A-103(4),
"Suspends payments" with respect to a bank means that it has been closed by order
of the supervisory authorities, that a public officer has been appointed to take it
over or that it ceases or refuses to make payments in the ordinary course of
business.
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The provision is drafted against the normal expectation of a
sender for a same-day service. 166 Delay may also be excused by
agreement 6 7 providing for a lower standard of service.168 In the
absence of either such an agreement or a timely rejection, the
section may be invoked by a transmitting bank that accepted a
transfer order pursuant to s. 4A-205(1)(d), that is, by allowing
midnight of the execution date to pass while having at its disposal
covering funds. 169 Such a transmitting bank is then liable under s.
4A-304(1)(c), except that it may then be discharged under s. 4A-
305.
One aspect of s. 4A-305 may not have been thought through
fully. Thus, under s. 4A-207(1), a transmitting bank executing a
transfer order assumes the risk of variations between the terms of
the order as sent and received through a communication system. 170
It is hard to see why such a bank may be excused under s. 4A-305
for delays resulting from "interruption of communication facilities
or equipment failure" and not for variations occurring in the
course of communication breakdown.
Section 4A-306 deals with the authority of a receiver to charge
its customer's 171 account 172 with the amount of the latter's transfer
order that has been accepted by the former. Subsection (1)
provides for the receiver's right to do so, but not before execution
or value date, depending on whether the receiver is a transmitting
or destination bank. A properly made charge to the customer's
account discharges its obligation as a sender, under s. 4A-302(2),
165 The language of s. 4A-305 may be compared with that of UCC 4-108(2), dealing with the
collection of cheques (and other paper-based debit items):
Delay by a collecting bank or payor bank beyond time limits prescribed or
permitted by this Act or by instructions is excused if caused by interruption of
communication facilities, suspension of payments by another bank, war,
emergency conditions or other circumstances beyond the control of the bank
provided it exercises such diligence as the circumstances require.
166 See Comment to 4A-305.
167 See s. 4A-304(1)(b) and (c).
168 See Comment to s. 4A-305.
169 And the fulfillment of all other requirements enumerated in subsecs. (1)(d) and (2) of s.
4A-205. See discussion, supra, in text around footnotes 111 to 115.
170 See in general Part 2(4), and text around footnote 129.
171 See definition quoted, supra, in footnote 64.
172 Under UCC 4-104(1)(a), explicitly adopted by reference by s. 4A-103(4), " 'Account'
means any account with a bank and includes a checking, time, interest or savings
account."
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to pay to the receiver the amount of the order that has been
accepted by the receiver.'73
Subsection (2) governs the situation where the customer's
account has insufficient funds to cover all incoming transfer orders
and items 174 payable from the account. In such a case, "the
receiver may charge the customer's account with respect to the
various items and transfer orders in any sequence convenient to
the receiver." It is not required to consider the competing items
and transfer orders in any particular order. 175
Rules governing the measure of damages for breach of obliga-
tions under Article 4A are provided for in s. 4A-307. Different
standards apply to various situations. These rules can be summa-
rized as follows:
(1) By failing either to give the beneficiary a timely notice of
receipt of a transfer order or to make a timely payment, the
destination bank176 becomes liable to the beneficiary "for
damages limited to compensation for the beneficiary's
expenses ... interest losses, and other incidental damages".
Where payment is not made by the destination bank "within a
reasonable time after demand" of the beneficiary, exposure
increases to "damages, including consequential damages,
proximately caused by the refusal to pay". The destination
bank may avoid this liability if it proves that its refusal
stemmed from "a reasonable doubt concerning the right of the
beneficiary to payment".
(2) The receiving transmitting bank's breach of the warranty
under s. 4A-304(1)(a), relating to the acceptance by the desti-
nation bank of the transfer's order carrying out the sender's
instructions,'177 either excuses the sender from paying the
receiver the amount of the transfer order, or if it has already
paid, 178 it is entitled to recover from the receiver "the amount
paid plus interest from the date of payment". No liability for
173 Discussed, supra, in Part 3(1). See Comment 1 to s. 4A-306.
174 Under UCC 4-104(1)(g), adopted by reference by s. 4A-103(4), "'Item' means any
instrument for the payment of money even though it is not negotiable but does not
include money."
175 See Comment 2 to s. 4A-306. Cf. UCC 4-303(2), providing that subject to rules relating
to creditor process, "items may be accepted, paid, certified or charged to the indicated
account of its customer in any order convenient to the bank."
176 That is, in breach of s. 4A-303, discussed, supra, in Part 3(1).
177 See, supra, Part 3(1).
178 As provided in s. 4A-302(2), discussed, supra, in Part 3(1).
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damages is fastened on the receiver for breach of that
warranty.
(3) A transmitting bank, either (i) breaking its undertakings
under s. 4A-304(1)(b) and (c), relating to compliance with the
sender's instructions and to the timely execution of its transfer
order, or (ii) breaking a contractual undertaking to accept the
sender's transfer order, 179 is liable for "damages limited to
compensation for the injured party's expenses . . . interest
losses, and other incidental damages". Consequential
damages, if proximately caused, may be recovered only in
exceptional circumstances where "liability is based on conduct
by the receiver in malicious disregard of the rights of the
injured party."
Section 4A-307 rejects the rule of Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank
Corp.,180 acknowledged by Comment 3 to be "[t]he leading
common law case on the subject of consequential damage". In
that case, an intermediary transmitting bank failed to execute in a
timely manner a transfer order for $27,000. Consequently, the
beneficiary did not receive timely payment and repudiated its
contract with the sending customer. The lower court181 held that
the intermediary transmitting bank was liable for consequential
loss on the basis of breach of contract and negligence. It awarded
the sending customer $2.1 million for lost profits under the
contract repudiated by the beneficiary. The Seventh Circuit 82
reversed on the basis of remoteness of damage. Under the
particular circumstances of the case, the loss was unforeseeable
since the intermediary transmitting bank had not been put on
notice of the special circumstances of the case. This left open the
possibility of bank liability for consequential loss where circum-
stances are known.
Comment 3 explicitly rejects Evra, finding it to be "not a
practical statutory solution to the problem of bank liability for
consequential damages". One troublesome aspect of Evra is the
uncertainty as to the amount of knowledge to be acquired by a
179 In the latter case (no. (ii)), "there is no liability under Section 4A-304 because there was
no acceptance, but there is liability for breach of the contract to accept." See Comment
3.
180 522 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. I11, 1981), revd 673 F. 2d 951 (7th Cir., 1982), cert. denied 103 S.
Ct. 377 (1983).
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
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bank before it becomes exposed to unlimited liability. But in the
final analysis, it was feared that the adoption of "the Evra rule"
would compromise two essential aspects of the modern wire
transfer system, that is, speed and low cost. The burden of timing
-payments and confirming their execution was explicitly put on the
sending customer. 183
(3) Payment
The fulfillment of the respective payment obligations of partici-
pants in a payment transaction is dealt with in various sections in
Article 4A.
Section 4A-308 deals with payment by the sending customer to
the beneficiary and the resulting discharge of the underlying
obligation. Comment 1 to s. 4A-308 regards subsec. (1) as stating
"the fundamental rule of Article 4A". Under this subsection
a sending customer pays the beneficiary of a transfer order issued by the
sending customer at the time and in the amount that a transfer order for the
benefit of the beneficiary is accepted by the destination bank in the payment
transaction.
Since acceptance by the destination bank generates its under-
taking to the beneficiary, 184 subsec. (1) in effect states that "a wire
transfer is accomplished by providing to the beneficiary the
obligation of the destination bank to pay the amount of the
transfer order."18 5
This time of payment is however stated by subsec. (1) to be
subject to s. 4A-206(3) governing revocation of a mistaken
transfer order that has been accepted by the destination bank, s.
4A-207 governing erroneous contents of transfer orders, 186 and s.
4A-309(4) and (5) dealing with the failure of a transmitting
bank. 187
Under s. 4A-308(2), where a payment under s. 4A-308(1) is
made to satisfy an obligation, "the obligation is [normally1 88]
183 Comment 3 to s. 4A-307. Needless to say, from the sending customer's viewpoint this is
not a desirable solution. It overlooks cash management considerations and is over-
optimistic as to the sending customer's ability to be in control of the situation.
Furthermore, in practical terms, no consequential damages under subsec. (3) means no
damages at all (except for refund of bank charges and interest).
184 See, supra, Part 3(1).
185 Comment 1 to s. 4A-308.
186 Sections 4A-206 to 207 are discussed, supra, in Part 2(4).
187 Section 4A-309 is discussed, infra, in Part 3(4).
188 The exceptions are set out below.
8-14 C.B.L.J.
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discharged to the same extent that discharge would result from
payment to the beneficiary of the same amount in money." It
seems however that notwithstanding the Comment, the point is
not so much "to substitute the obligation of the destination bank
for the obligation of the sending customer" by analogy to the
effect of payment by means of a cashier's cheque 8 9 under UCC
3-802(1)(a).190 Rather, the combined effect of s. 4A-308(1) and (2)
is to treat payment by wire transfer as the equivalent of payment
by means of a deposit made by the sending customer into the
beneficiary's bank account. 191
Section 4A-308 settles a major uncertainty in wire transfers law.
In their search for "finality of payment", courts focused on various
points in the payment process, such as the receipt of the transfer
order by the destination bank, the destination bank's decision to
credit the beneficiary's account or the actual credit posted to the
account, the communication of the advice of credit to the benefi-
ciary, and the irreversibility of the credit posted to the benefici-
ary's account. 192 Judicial efforts failed to reach a uniform rule. 193
The uncertainty is removed and the controversy is eliminated by
Article 4A which selects the acceptance by the destination bank as
the crucial point. It is noteworthy that so far as the sending
customer is concerned, "irrevocability" is determined by the
"execution" of the transfer order by the originating bank, 194 while
"payment" is made at a later stage, upon the "acceptance" by the
destination bank. Except for in a "book transfer", "revocability"
is thus lost prior to "payment" being made. 195
189 That is, a bill drawn by a commercial bank on itself. Under Canadian banking termi-
nology, this is the same as bank draft.
190 This provides that "Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an under-
lying obligation ... the obligation is pro tanto discharged if a bank is drawer, maker or
acceptor of the instrument and there is no recourse on the instrument against the under-
lying obligor".
191 The cashier's cheque analogy is quite weak since the bank liable thereunder is in a
similar position to that of the sending customer's bank, and not the beneficiary's bank,
as it is in a wire transfer.
192 Leading authorities include The Brimnes, Tenax Steamship Co. Ltd. v. The Brimnes
(Owners), [1974] 3 All E.R. 88 (C.A.); Momm v. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd., [1977] Q.B.
790; Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp. of Liberia (The "Laconia"),
[1977] A.C. 850 (H.L.); and A/S Awilco v. Fulvia S.p.A di Navigazione (The
"Chikuma"), [1981] 1 All E.R. 652 (H.L.).
193 See in general, Introduction (2), supra.
194 Under s. 4A-206(1), discussed, supra, around footnotes 118-122.
195 This indeed underlies Ellinger's efforts to reconcile existing case law. See the paragraph,
supra, containing footnotes 38 and 39.
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Section 4A-308(2) is premised on the assumption that
contracting parties are likely to agree to payment by way of a wire
transfer, so that unless expressly prohibited by contract as a means
of payment, a transfer order accepted by the destination bank
results in the discharge of the underlying obligation. 19 6 At the
same time, the provision explicitly states that no discharge of the
sending customer's underlying obligation to the beneficiary is
achieved by means of payment under s. 4A-308(1) where (i) such
means of payment was prohibited by contract, (ii) payment was
refused by the beneficiary "within a reasonable time after
receiving notice of receipt of the transfer order by the destination
bank", (iii) pertaining funds have not been withdrawn by the
beneficiary or applied to his debt, and (iv) the beneficiary would
incur loss that could reasonably have been avoided if payment had
been made by means that complied with the contract. The
example provided by Comment 3 to such circumstances involves a
beneficiary's contract requiring sending customer's payment by a
cashier's cheque of Bank A. Instead, the sending customer paid by
means of a wire transfer to the beneficiary's account to Bank B.
Following acceptance by Bank B but prior to a reasonable oppor-
tunity for withdrawal by the beneficiary, Bank B failed. The
sending customer's underlying obligation is not discharged since
he cannot impose the risk of Bank B's insolvency on a beneficiary
that specified another means of payment that did not entail that
risk. Of course, one must presuppose that the cashier's cheque
would not have been collected by the beneficiary through its bank
account with Bank B.
Section 4A-308(2) does not cover the entire scope of the benefi-
ciary's right to refuse payment accepted for him by the destination
bank. The point is highlighted by reference to the decision of the
House of Lords in The Laconia.197 In that case the destination
bank accepted a transfer order in payment made by the sending
customer to the beneficiary. Payment was made out of time under
the terms of the contract between the sending customer and the
beneficiary. Acceptance would have deprived the beneficiary of
his right to repudiate the contract on the basis of the sending
customer's breach. The beneficiary was notified of the payment
shortly after the receipt of the transfer order by the destination
196 See Comment 2 to s. 4A-308.
197 Supra, footnote 192.
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bank. It promptly advised the destination bank of its rejection and
was allowed by the House of Lords to refuse payment. In that
case, payment was not made by the sending customer "by a means
prohibited by the contract" and hence the circumstances allowing
the beneficiary to refuse payment under s. 4A-308(2) would not
have been applied. It is unfortunate that Article 4A does not
provide guidance as to the scope of the beneficiary's rejection
rights under circumstances such as dealt with in The Laconia.
However, it is submitted that s. 4A-308(2), speaking of the
discharge of the underlying obligation by payment, should not be
taken to eliminate altogether the beneficiary's rejection rights. In
any event, payment may be made not in discharge of any
subsisting obligation. Sound policies require that the beneficiary
be conferred the power to reject such payments.
Payment by the destination bank to the beneficiary is governed
by s. 4A-303(3). Such payment is made in satisfaction of the desti-
nation bank's obligation under s. 4A-303(2). 198 Where the desti-
nation bank credits an account of the beneficiary with respect to a
transfer order accepted by the destination bank,
payment by the destination bank to the beneficiary occurs when and to the
extent that the beneficiary is given the right to withdraw the credit or the
destination bank applies the credit to a debt of the beneficiary.
The beneficiary's right to withdraw funds credited to his account
must be unconditional and withdrawn funds are not to be recov-
erable, unless "payment was made by mistake and the beneficiary
is not entitled to receive or retain the payment under the law
governing mistake and restitution", or except for in connection
with circumstances provided for under s. 4A-309(4) and (5)
governing the failure of a transmitting bank. Payment into the
beneficiary's bank account can however be made otherwise than
by releasing funds to the beneficiary. Rather, the resulting credit
in the beneficiary's account can be applied to a debt of the benefi-
ciary, either to the destination bank exercising its setoff right, or to
a third party garnishor. 199
According to s. 4A-303(5), where the destination bank pays
directly to the beneficiary, rather than into its bank account, time
of payment is determined under general principles of law, outside
Article 4A. Comment 6 to s. 4A-303 explains that this applies "to
198 Discussed, supra, in Part 3(1).
199 See Comment 3 to s. 4A-303.
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the uncommon cases in which the beneficiary does not have an
account with the destination bank". In such circumstances, the
destination bank may pay the beneficiary by a means specified in
the order of "any other commercially reasonable means".
Payment should be remitted, or notice be given, by the destination
bank to the beneficiary "before midnight of the day following the
day of acceptance". 200
Payment by a sender to a receiver is governed by s. 4A-302(3).
Such payment satisfies the sender's engagement under s. 4A-
302(2) providing for the sender's obligation to pay the receiver the
amount of a transfer order accepted by the receiver. 201 Subsection
(3) of s. 4A-302 provides for the following rules:
(i) Payment to a receiving bank by a sending bank may occur
when credit to the former's account with the latter "becomes
withdrawable by the receiver", provided that "the sender's
obligation is not settled through the Federal Reserve System."
(ii) Where the sender is a bank and the sender's obligation is
settled through the Federal Reserve System, the sender's
payment occurs "when the receiver receives final settlement of
the obligation". This applies to FedWire transfers. It also
applies to a wire transfer system such as CHIPS ,202 providing
for a settlement service premised on the netting of daily
interbank transfers, and the settlement of resulting amounts
owed by net debtor banks to net creditor banks by means of a
FedWire transfer from each net debtor bank into a special
account. This is then followed by a FedWire transfer from the
special account to each net creditor bank. 20 3
(iii)Where the sender is not a bank, or is a bank that does not settle
through the Federal Reserve System, 2°4 and the receiver
charged an account of the sender with the receiver with respect
to the transfer order, the sender's payment to the receiver
occurs "when the charge becomes final". With respect to a
receiver which is a destination bank, the charge becomes final
"when the receiver accepts the sender's order". With respect
to a receiver which is a transmitting bank, the charge becomes
200 Section 4A-303(5).
201 See in general, Part 3(1), supra.
202 For CHIPS settlement, see B. Geva, "CHIPS Transfer of Funds", forthcoming in J. Int.
Banking L. (U.K.).
203 Comment 3 to s. 4A-302.
204 Comment 5 to s. 4A-302.
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final as soon as the receiver executes the sender's order and
pays its own transfer order. Accordingly, "[f]inality is defined
as occurring when the payment transaction is completed". 20 5
This rule governs the relationship between the sending
customer and the originating bank,2 6 and any interbank
transfer settled through a correspondent account of the sender
with the receiver.
(iv)In other situations, payment "is governed by applicable
principles of law that determine when an obligation is
satisfied". This applies to a sending customer paying over the
counter for a transfer order to be issued to a receiver, or more
in general, "to the uncommon cases in which the sender
doesn't have an account with the receiver or doesn't settle
through the Federal Reserve System". 207
(4) Failure of a Bank Sender
Section 4A-309 governs the allocation of the risk of loss incurred
in the event of the suspension of payment by a bank sender. The
rules provided by it "are designed to cause the least amount of
commercial disruption". 20 8 Under subsec. (2), the section applies
to a payment transaction in which there is a "failed bank", defined
in subsec. (1)(a) as a "bank sender" that suspended payments20 9
while its obligation under s. 4A-302(2) 210 was unpaid, and the
destination bank has accepted a transfer order that results in
payment from the sending customer to the beneficiary under s.
4A-308(1). 211 Under subsec. (1)(b) a "bank sender" is "a sender
that is a bank", i.e., either a transmitting bank or a bank sending
customer.
In the absence of any statutory rule, the receiver from the failing
bank bears the loss, at least initially. Whether this receiver can
shift the loss to the subsequent receiver in the payment trans-
action, all the way up to the beneficiary, by arguing that the trans-
mission of funds in a payment transaction is conditional on each
receiver being paid, has not been determined by case law.
205 Ibid.
206 An undefined term, denoting the first transmitting bank, that is, the sending customer's
bank. See, supra, text at footnote 68.
207 Comment 6 to s. 4A-302.
208 Comment 2 to s. 4A-309.
209 Definition of "suspends payment" in UCC 4-104(1)(k), is explicitly adopted by
reference in s. 4A-103(3), and is reproduced, supra, in footnote 164.
210 Discussed, supra, in Part 3(1).
211 Discussed, supra, in Part 3(3).
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Section 4A-309 purports to present a pragmatic scheme, unfet-
tered by doctrinal considerations. Its first objective is to carry out
the payment transaction while avoiding any loss caused by a trans-
mitting bank's failure. However, if a sender has prepaid the failed
bank, the loss may be allocated to it.
Subsection (3) states the basic rule of s. 4A-309. It applies only
where the failed bank is an intermediary transmitting bank, that is,
it is neither a bank sending customer nor the originating bank, 212
and where the insolvency proceedings of the failed bank are
governed by domestic American laws. Under subsec. (3), a failed
bank is excused from its obligation under s. 4A-302(2) 213 to pay the
receiver that accepted the failed bank's transfer order. It also loses
the benefit of its sender's payment obligation under s. 4A-301(2).
On its part, "[t]he bank sender, if it has not suspended payments,
is obliged to pay the amount of its transfer order to the next
receiver in the payment transaction that is not a failed bank." 214
In other words, the sender's payment obligation under s. 4A-
302(2), shifts from its receiver, that is the failed transmitting bank,
to the subsequent receiver, that is "the next receiver in the
payment transaction". Likewise, the subsequent receiver's right
to payment under s. 4A-302(2) shifts from its sender, that is the
failed transmitting bank, to the sender of the transfer order to the
failed bank. The failed bank, being merely a conduit in passing the
funds to the destination bank, is simply removed from the chain. 215
Its liability is excused and its right is forfeited.
This rule is designed to provide a mechanism for getting
payment to the destination bank without the failed bank. It
reflects the underlying principle of Article 4A under which the
essential role of each transmitting bank is not to pay, but rather to
issue a transfer order. It is the destination bank's obligation to the
beneficiary, arising upon this bank's acceptance of its sender's
transfer order, that constitutes the sending customer's payment to
the beneficiary. Payment by a transmitting bank of its obligation to
a receiver that accepts its order is not essential to the completion
of the wire transfer. 216 Hence, where a transmitting bank fails, the
212 Cf. text which follows footnote 211, and around footnote 68.
213 Discussed, supra, in Part 3(1).
214 According to Comment 4, the requirement under which the "next receiver" to be paid
must not be "a failed bank", is designed to cover "the case in which more than one bank
is a failed bank in the payment transaction".
215 See Comment 3.
216 Ibid.
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objective of completing payment can best be accomplished by
removing the failed bank altogether from the transmission chain.
Where the failed bank has not been prepaid by its sender, its
"removal" under subsec. (3) results in loss avoidance. The obliga-
tions owed to and by the failing bank set off each other. The
payment transaction is carried out as if the failed bank has not
been part of the chain and participants' respective liabilities are
adjusted accordingly. At the same time, a sender of a transfer
order issued to a failed bank which prepaid217 its obligation under
s. 4A-302 bears the loss incurred by virtue of the bank failure. This
is so since the prepaying sender is not relieved under subsec. (3)
from the obligation to pay the subsequent receiver.
In situations not governed by subsec. (3), subsec. (4) allows the
destination bank to revoke its acceptance of the transfer order,
under the following conditions:
(1) The destination bank did not receive payment of the order,
(2) The destination bank paid the beneficiary pursuant to an
agreement "giving the destination bank the right to recover
the amount paid to the beneficiary because of the failure to
receive payment", and
(3) The destination bank accepted a transfer order either "issued
by the failed bank", or "with respect to which it is not entitled
to payment because the failed bank failed to pay the transfer
order". 218
According to Comment 7, subsec. (4) covers three types of
cases: first, cases in which the failed bank is the originating bank
that executed the transfer order of a non-bank customer;
secondly, cases in which the failed bank is a bank sending
customer; and thirdly, cases in which the insolvency of the failed
bank is not governed by domestic American laws. 219
Under subsec. (5), revocation of acceptance ought to be made
by the destination bank by notice to the beneficiary. Notice must
be given "before the close of the wire transfer business day of the
destination bank following the day the failed bank suspended
217 When "prepayment" occurs is determined according to s. 4A-302(3), discussed, supra,
in Part 3(3). See Comment 6 to s. 4A-309.
218 The latter involves a case in which a solvent receiver situated in the transmission chain
between the failing bank and the destination bank issues its transfer order to the desti-
nation bank under an agreement which relieves it from payment when it fails to receive
payment from the failed bank. See Comment 7, last paragraph.
219 Compare with text, supra, around footnote 212.
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payment". Revocation allows the destination bank to recover
payment from the beneficiary under the terms of their agreement.
Revocation of acceptance results in treating the transfer order
"as never having been accepted". Accordingly, the sending
customer's obligation in the underlying transaction has not been
discharged under s. 4A-308(2). 220 Likewise each sender is relieved
from its payment obligation under s. 4A-302(2), the latter being
excused by the breach of warranty under s. 4A-304(1)(a). 221 The
overall effect is thus to "unwind" the transaction, or to treat it as
"an attempted transfer that was not completed". 222 Under those
circumstances, the sender which has prepaid the failed bank is to
bear the loss. Where no prepaying sender is involved, loss is
avoided altogether. This does not take into account the impact of
the failure to complete a timely payment on the contractual
relationship between the sending customer and the beneficiary.
In general, "finality of payment" policy is best carried out by a
rule providing for a destination bank's guaranty of payment to the
beneficiary. Inasmuch as s. 4A-309 does not allocate the loss of a
sender bank failure to the beneficiary and restricts the right of the
destination bank to revoke its acceptance and recover from the
beneficiary, the provision appears to be consistent with "finality of
payment" policy. 223 At the same time, by insulating the desti-
nation bank from loss incurred by a sender bank failure, s. 4A-309
appears to undermine this "finality of payment" policy. However,
the procedure of bypassing the failed bank under subsec. (3)
militates against the latter conclusion. Indeed, the principal policy
underlying s. 4A-309, that of payment completion, is quite
consistent with "finality of payment".
In turn, the rule allocating prepayment loss to the prepaying
sender is generally quite defensible. Indeed, as acknowledged by
220 Discussed, supra, in Part 3(3).
221 Discussed, supra, in Part 3(1).
222 See Comment 7, middle paragraph.
223 A Previous Draft did not allow the destination bank to revoke acceptance where the
failed bank was a "bank designated by the destination bank or beneficiary". However,
the destination bank could then recover payment from the beneficiary if such course of
action had been authorized under the terms of their agreement. In such a case, the
beneficiary was subrogated to the destination bank's claim against the failed bank. In
permitting recovery from the beneficiary, the rule undermined finality of payment.
Much can be said however in favour of a rule allocating to the destination bank loss
resulting from the failure of a correspondent bank selected by it. Such a rule may
encourage prudence in selecting an intermediary.
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the Comment, there is no principled basis for choosing between
the prepaying sender and the subsequent receiver; both gave
credit to the intermediary failed bank.224 Nevertheless, the
decision not to prepay or even send a transfer order to a bank on
credit risk grounds may be easier than the decision not to accept a
bank's transfer order on credit grounds. Hence, it may be margi-
nally more defensible to have the prepaying sender rather than the
subsequent receiver bear the risk of the intermediary's failure, as
indeed provided in s. 4A-309. But when the prepaying sender is a
non-bank sending customer, policy considerations may be more
equivocal. On one hand, subject to deposit insurance, the risk of
failure by a bank holding a customer's deposit is a normal risk run
by such a customer. On the other hand, inasmuch as the trans-
mittal of transfer orders has been completed, so that prior to its
failure the failed bank allowed the sending customer to
"withdraw" the sum of payment from the deposit, it might be
fairer not to allow banks to shift the loss back to the sending
customer, but rather to leave it with the receiver from the failing
bank.
Where the destination bank is allowed to revoke its acceptance,
finality of payment is sacrificed, albeit with the goal of avoiding
delays in acceptance by the destination bank or even outright
rejections by it. Arguably, by allowing the destination bank to be
relatively uncritical in accepting transfer orders, the policy of
encouraging speedy implementation of payment transactions is
thereby enhanced.
Conclusion
The major accomplishment of Article 4A is the introduction of
uniform terminology and certainty as to the basic liabilities of
parties to a payment transaction. The certainty relates to scope of
liabilities, delineation of entitlements, and determination of the
timings of such liabilities and entitlements. In that regard, while
not being flawless, Draft Article 4A is model law for payment by
wire transfer.
224 See Comment 6.
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